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Neutrality in International Taxation
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Abstract:
Neutrality plays a central role in the literature on international taxation. In its
most prevalent form, the concept of neutrality posits that in order to maximize
aggregate global welfare, capital needs to flow to where it would produce the
highest pretax return. The thesis of this Article is that neutrality is ordinarily
inapplicable in the field of international taxation.
When considering neutrality in the international arena, the problem that one
encounters is that the term “international taxation” is commonly used to
describe a number of very different types of tax regimes (what the Article refers
to as “intranational taxation,” “supranational taxation,” and “interjurisdictional taxation”). Although the literature tends not to distinguish among
them, the different types of international tax regimes are conceptually distinct
and require radically dissimilar guiding principles. The Article argues that
neutrality is an appropriate principle with regard to only one type of
international taxation: a hypothetical non-Pigouvian supranational tax. With
regard to intranational taxation, neutrality has no role to play, as a rational
country will exploit its tax system to promote the welfare of its own constituents
without regard to which investments it would have attracted in a no-tax world.
With regard to a hypothetical Pigouvian supranational tax and in particular
with regard to the much-scrutinized field of inter-jurisdictional taxation,
neutrality is irrelevant, as here it is the after-tax return and not the pretax
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return that is determinative of allocative efficiency. Promoting neutrality would
undermine the very goals that the principle of neutrality purports to serve.
The Article concludes by noting that the current discourse with regard to
international taxation is fraught with conceptual confusion. First, there is a
tendency to rely upon concepts that were developed within the context of
domestic taxation without a thorough examination of their applicability to the
international arena. Second, there is a tendency to lump together a number of
very distinct types of tax regimes under the overbroad category of international
taxation, and to ignore the fact that due to the fundamental dissimilarities
among them, the principles of tax theory relevant to each will also be different.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The concept of neutrality plays a central role in the literature on
international taxation. In its most prevalent form, it posits that taxes should
not be a factor in investment decisions.1 The underlying idea is that in order
to maximize aggregate global welfare, capital needs to flow to where it is
able to produce the highest pretax return. Consequently, when those
investments that offer the highest pretax returns do not offer the highest
after-tax return, capital will be misdirected. Therefore, allocative efficiency
can only be achieved when alternative investments bear similar tax
burdens.2
1
The idea that taxes should not influence investment decisions is often referred to as
capital export neutrality (CEN). CEN prescribes that capital should be subject to the same
tax burden whether it is invested at home or abroad. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. HANNA, TAX
POLICY IN A NUTSHELL 231 (2018); Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax
Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014, 1043 (2012); STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON,
PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 330-31 (2018); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD],
Are the Current Treaty Rules for Taxing Business Profits Appropriate for E-Commerce?
Final Report, at 13 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/arethecurrenttreatyrulesfortaxing
businessprofitsappropriatefore-commerce.htm. Although ordinarily stated terms of a twooption scenario (home or abroad), CEN is actually a multiple-option scenario. It effectively
requires that capital be subject to the same tax burden wherever it is invested. Other concepts
of neutrality discussed in the literature include capital import neutrality (CIN) and capital
ownership neutrality (CON). See, e.g., JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34115,
REFORM OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ALTERNATIVES 5-10 (2010); CHARLES H.
GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 20-22 (4th ed. 2011); Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality:
Reconsiderations, 27 VA. TAX REV. 203, 205 (2007). Under CIN, all capital invested in a
particular jurisdiction should be subject to the same tax burden. CON requires that it be
“impossible to increase output by trading capital ownership among investors.” Mihir A.
Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT. TAX. J. 487, 495
(2003). One prominent commentator has described the various types of neutrality as
“alphabet soup” and has castigated the debate over which should guide international tax
policy as a “battle of the acronyms.” DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 14 (2014). Nevertheless, CEN has dominated the international tax discourse and
is the subject matter of this Article.
2
See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2000) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Crisis]; J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the
International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 12-13,
n.43 (2014); Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L.
REV. 261, 285 (2001), reprinted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 83 (2016); Yoram Keinan, The Case for Residency-Based
Taxation of Financial Transactions in Developing Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 34-35
(2008); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 569 (5th ed. 1989); Avi Nov, The “Bidding War” to Attract Foreign Direct
Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REV. 835, 844 (2006); Oleksandr
Pastukhov, International Taxation of Income Derived From Electronic Commerce: Current
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A number of means have been suggested to help achieve this goal.
One is for countries to tax the worldwide income of their individual
residents and domestic corporations at the same rates (for the sake of
convenience, I will refer both to individual residents and to domestic
corporations as “residents”).3 When a taxpayer is faced with the same tax
rate wherever it chooses to invest, then those investments that offer the
highest pretax return will also offer the highest after-tax return. However,
even when countries do impose tax on the worldwide income of their
residents, those ostensibly subject to their home country’s tax regime can
often escape – or at least defer – the payment of tax on their foreign income
by operating abroad via foreign corporations or foreign subsidiaries.4 To
combat such maneuvers, countries sometimes tax the foreign income not
only of their residents but also of foreign corporations that are owned or
controlled by residents.5 In fact, one of the proposals raised in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD)
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is that countries
strengthen their Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) tax regime.6
Another method that has been suggested for achieving neutrality in the
international arena and which has been the focus of most of the literature in
international taxation since the turn of the current century, is to harmonize
Problems and Possible Solutions, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 310, 325-326 (2006); Adam H.
Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens? 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 946-947 (2010);
Shaheen, supra note 1, at 233; SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 114; Joel Slemrod & Reuven AviYonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal With Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV.
533, 554 (2002).
3
See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic
Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 698, 707 (2008);
Edward Troup & Paul Hale, EU Initiatives on Tax Harmonization: Do as I Say, Not as I
Do?, 17 TAX NOTES INT’L 1081, 1082 (1998).
4
Furthermore, corporations that are residents of high-tax countries can often expatriate
and thereby escape their ex-home country’s tax regime. In the United States, because the
criteria for determining corporate residency is place of incorporation, tax advisors have
developed a number of techniques known as inversions, that effectively operate to convert a
U.S.-registered corporation into a foreign-registered corporation. See, e.g., Steven Goldman,
Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 71 (2008); GRAETZ, supra note
2, at 321; Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1654-55
(2013); DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568,
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 4-5 (2016); Adam H.
Rosenzweig, Source as a Solution to Residence, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 471, 497 (2015); Joseph
A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activities,” 33
VA. TAX REV. 353, 354 (2013).
5
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 951 (controlled foreign corporations), 951A (global intangible
low-taxed income), 954(c) (foreign personal holding company), 1297 (passive foreign
investment company) (Westlaw 2017).
6
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Designing Effective Controlled
Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 – 2015 Final Report (2015) [hereinafter OECD, Action 3],
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241152-en.pdf?expires=1557652675&id
=id&accname=guest&checksum=8BFE625B1A05DF8CD7A77CD3A6DFFE14.
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the tax regimes of the various countries, at least as far as the taxation of
international investments is concerned. Again, if an investor faces similar
tax burdens wherever it chooses to invest, then investment decisions will
not be driven by tax forces and capital will flow to where it can produce the
highest pretax return. The goal of neutralizing the effect of tax on
investment decisions is one of the key justifications raised by the OECD for
its campaign of combatting tax competition.7
International tax scholars generally agree that pretax return is
determinative of allocative efficiency and, furthermore, that when
investment decisions are influenced by tax considerations the result is a
misallocation of resources and a diminution of aggregate global welfare.
True, not all scholars believe that it is appropriate for countries to cooperate
in order to create a neutral international tax regime. Some contend that
countries should pursue their own national interests even when it conflicts
with broader global interests.8 Others hold that because it is impossible in
practice to guarantee full cooperation by all countries and even a small
number of non-conformers is enough to create distortions, countries are
justified in pursuing their own narrow national interests.9 Nonetheless, even
those who justify the pursuit of national interest in the design of tax regimes
tend to accept the underlying proposition that there is an inherent conflict
between national interest and global interest and that a neutral international
tax regime, in which investment decisions are not influenced by tax
considerations, would better promote global welfare.10
This Article challenges that proposition. Its primary thesis is that, in
most instances, allocative efficiency in the international arena requires that
capital flows to the venue that offers the highest after-tax return. Attempts
to neutralize the effects of taxation and to direct capital to those venues that
offer the highest pretax return would, in most instances, produce allocative
7

See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A
Retrospective After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783, 793 (2009); Yariv Brauner, An
International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 263, 291, 294-97 (2003);
Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future
of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 151 (2009) (“The primary appeal of . .
. harmonization is rooted in a concern for economic efficiency.”); GRAETZ, supra note 2, at
320-23; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative
Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377, 386, 389 (2008).
8
See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 108-09.
9
See, e.g., TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND
COOPERATION, 58-59 (2018) (“[N]eutrality . . . cannot prevail absent cooperation among
states. Significantly, all the efficiency arguments made by proponents of partial neutrality
collapse without the cooperation of a large enough number of countries . . . In the current
decentralized international tax regime, complete global neutrality is unattainable and partial
neutrality highly doubtful. Thus, instead of pursuing the elusive goal of neutrality, states
should pursue policies that support their national interests.”); see generally Mitchell Kane,
Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY
L.J. 89 (2004).
10 See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 9, at 57-60; SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 114.
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inefficiency to the detriment of aggregate global welfare.
The differences between the domestic arena (where neutrality is
usually, although not always, an important goal for policy-makers to
pursue) and the international arena (where neutrality is usually, although
not always, not only irrelevant as a principle of tax theory but would prove
counterproductive if it could be achieved) are that the tax imposed by home
countries on foreign residents is not really a tax, but rather a price of access
to the host country’s territory; that the amount of tax that it can charge is
determined by the supply of and demand for international investment and
international investment venues; and that because the tax is part and parcel
of the market mechanism, it is the relative after-tax return and not the
relative pretax return that encapsulates allocative efficiency.
The principle of neutrality was developed in the arena of domestic
taxation, where the country is implicitly viewed as a closed economy
without any contact with foreign persons, foreign investments, and foreign
tax regimes. Part II presents the principle of neutrality as it applies in this
arena. It explains how allocative efficiency requires that investments flow
to where they can produce that highest pretax return and that when
investments that offer the highest pretax return do not offer the highest
after-tax return, capital is misdirected and societal welfare suffers.
However, it also shows that even within the purely domestic arena,
neutrality is not a universally applicable principle, as it does not apply to
Pigouvian taxation.
The question that arises then is whether the principle of neutrality is
applicable to international taxation. However, in order to answer that
question, we first need to explore what is meant by the term “international
taxation.” Part III argues that the term is overbroad and is used to describe
three very different types of tax regimes. The first (which I call
“intranational taxation”) describes international aspects of a country’s
domestic tax regime, including but not limited to, its taxation of nonresidents. The second (which I call “supranational taxation”) describes a
hypothetical tax imposed by a supranational entity. The third (which I call
“inter-jurisdictional taxation”) describes the coordination of various
countries’ intranational tax regimes. Although the literature often confuses
these three types of international tax regimes and refers to them
indiscriminately as international taxation, clearly distinguishing among
them is crucial, as the principles of tax theory that apply to each are very
different.
Part IV then explores the applicability of neutrality to each of these
international tax regimes. Supranational taxation is the most similar to
purely domestic taxation: neutrality would be an appropriate consideration
with regard to supranational taxes, except for supranational Pigouvian
taxes. With respect to intranational taxation, I will argue that the tax
countries impose on non-residents is in substance not really a tax but rather
a price of access to the host country’s territory. The goals of a host country
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in designing its intranational tax regime will include attracting beneficial
investment, deterring detrimental investment, and maximizing the tax
revenue collected from those investments that do occur. Within such
framework, neutrality will not be a relevant concern. Moving to intrajurisdictional taxation, I will argue that whereas intranational taxation
reflects the supply of and the demand for international investment and
international investment venues, it constitutes part and parcel of the
international market mechanism. Consequently, I will argue that from the
perspective of global welfare, it is the after-tax return that indicates where
resources are being used most efficiently. Any attempt to disrupt this
process by neutralizing the effect of intranational taxation on investments
will misdirect capital and create allocative inefficiency.
Part V will summarize the findings and offer some concluding
thoughts.
II.

NEUTRALITY IN DOMESTIC TAXATION
The concept of neutrality was developed within the realm of purely
domestic taxation, that is, where the country is a closed economy with no
consideration given to foreign persons, foreign income, or foreign tax
systems. Therefore, before we consider neutrality in international taxation
we will explore its function in the purely domestic arena. Later, we will
introduce international factors and examine how the principle of neutrality
fares outside of the purely domestic arena.
A. Non-Pigouvian Taxation
The principle of neutrality proceeds from the presumption that the
market is ordinarily an efficient means of allocating resources.11 The
underlying idea is that if there exists a more efficient allocation of resources
than the one that exists (i.e., if there is an alternative allocation in which at
least one person is better-off and no one is worse-off), and if there are no
regulatory or other impediments to their doing so, individuals and firms will
exchange goods and services so as to realize the more efficient allocation.
To take a simple example, if Adrienne values Bruce’s labor at $100 an hour
and Bruce values his leisure at $80 an hour, it will be in the interest of both
of them for Adrienne to pay Bruce, say, $90 an hour for his work. Such a
transaction will constitute a Pareto improvement over the previous
distribution.12 Under classic economic theory, individuals and firms will
11 Absent this assumption, there would be no reason to attempt to preserve the pretax tax
allocation of resources and to strive for neutrality in the tax system. An important exception
to the applicability of the principle of neutrality in domestic taxation is Pigouvian taxation.
See infra Part II.B.
12 A move from Distribution A to Distribution B constitutes a Pareto improvement if at
least one person prefers Distribution B and no one prefers Distribution A. Vilfredo Pareto,
Manuel d’Economie Politique, in A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES 1870-1929, 225 (T.W.
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continue to exchange goods and services until there is no possible exchange
that makes anyone better without making someone else worse. At that
point, the allocation of resources will satisfy the requirements of Pareto
efficiency.13
Taxation can disrupt this process by preventing efficiency-enhancing
exchanges. To demonstrate, let us return to our example of Adrienne and
Bruce, but now assume that the government imposes an income tax at the
rate of 30%. The most that Adrienne would be willing to pay Bruce is $100.
From Bruce’s perspective the best that Adrienne can offer is after-tax pay
of $70, which is less than the value he places on his leisure. As there is no
price which Adrienne would be willing to pay and which Bruce would be
willing to accept, no deal will be consummated. Bruce will end up with
leisure that he values at $80; Adrienne will end up without Bruce’s labor,
which she values at $100, and the government will collect no tax. An
opportunity to increase societal welfare will have been squandered.14
This phenomenon is described in the economic literature as a
deadweight loss.15 Deadweight loss is defined as the difference between the
welfare cost imposed upon individuals by the tax and the amount of tax
collected by the government.16 To demonstrate, if in our example the tax
were only 6% and the wage rate remained $90 an hour, Bruce would suffer
a $5.40 welfare loss (after-tax income of $84.60 versus non-taxed income
of $90), and the government would collect $5.40 in taxes. The deadweight
loss – the difference between Bruce’s welfare loss and the taxes collected
by the government – would be $0. On the other hand, if the tax were 30%
and consequently Adrienne did not end up hiring Bruce, Bruce would suffer
Hutchinson ed. & trans., 1953). The text assumes that Adrienne’s hiring of Bruce entails no
negative externalities or that any externalities are accounted for by appropriate Pigouvian
taxation. See infra Part II.B.
13 Distribution A is Pareto efficient when there is no Distribution B such that
Distribution B is a Pareto improvement over Distribution A. Pareto, supra note 12, at 225. In
other words, a distribution is Pareto efficient when it is not possible to raise anyone’s
welfare level without lowering someone else’s welfare level.
14 See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 919, 929 n.26 (1997); V. Patrice Wylly, Now You See it, Now You Don’t:
Taxpayers’ Strategic Use of the Informal Job Market in Their Labor Responses to Effective
Marginal Tax Rates Under the Earned Income Tax Credit, 37 VA. TAX REV. 109, 127
(2017).
15 See, e.g., 1 RHONA C. FREE, 21ST CENTURY ECONOMICS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
258-59 (2010); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market
Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 61-62 (2011); Arnold C. Harberger, The
Measurement of Waste, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 58, 59 (1964); N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 159-66 (4th ed. 2007).
16 See, e.g., Terrance O’Reilly, Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX
REV. 583, 584 (2008); Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax
Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 859, 864 (2002); David A.
Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1627, 1651 (1999).
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a $10 welfare loss (he would have leisure worth $80 instead of $90 cash),
Adrienne would suffer a $10 welfare loss (she would have $90 cash instead
of labor worth $100), and the government would collect $0 in tax. The
deadweight loss in this scenario would be $20.
The principle of neutrality posits that the best types of taxes are those
that least affect behavior and thus minimize the deadweight loss. For
instance, the concept of neutrality is one of the ideas behind traditional tax
reform, which seeks to lower the tax rate by broadening the base. The
broader the base the more difficult it is to avoid the tax by changing one’s
behavior, and the lower the rate the less incentive there is to avoid the tax
by changing one’s behavior. In contrast, a high tax rate combined with a
narrow base provides both the incentive and the opportunity to engage in
tax avoidance.17
In more technical terms, the principle of neutrality can be described by
reference to the substitution effect and its impact on the marginal rate of
transformation. In an efficient economy, the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) of one consumer good for another, of leisure for consumer goods,
and of present consumption for future consumption will equal their
marginal rate of transformation (MRT).18 Assume, for instance, that
marginal consumers consider product P1 to be worth ten times as much as
product P2 and consequently the price of P1 is ten times that of P2. Any
factor of production that can produce more than ten times as much P 2 as P1
will be used to produce P2, while any factor of production that can produce
less than ten times as much P2 as P1 will be used to produce P1. In other
words, the MRS (as expressed by consumer preferences) of P1 for P2 will
equal the MRT of P1 for P2. In such a state of affairs, resources are being
used in their most efficient manner to satisfy consumer demand.
Now assume that the government imposes an excise tax of 50% on P1.
The price of P1 will now be fifteen times that of P2. Consumers for whom
P1 is worth more than ten but less than fifteen times as much as P2 will now
17

See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM G. GALE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 1 (1996); Gordon T. Butler, The One Fund Solution: “It’s My
Money and I Need It Now!,” 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 262, 317 (2011); Michael J. Graetz,
The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a “Flat-Rate” Tax,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 530 (1983); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX
REV. 205, 215 (2012); Toru Morotomi, Japan’s Shift to Territoriality in 2009 and the Recent
Corporate Tax Reform: A Japan-United States Comparison of Taxing Income From
Multinationals, 14 PITT. TAX REV. 173, 177 (2017); Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be
Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1200 (2017).
18 The rates of transformation of one consumer good for another, of leisure for consumer
goods, and of present consumption for future consumption are prices, wages, and interest,
respectively. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 2, at 61. See also David Aschauer &
Jeremy Greenwood, A Further Exploration in the Theory of Exchange Rate Regimes, 91 J.
OF POL. ECON. 868, 869-872 (1983); Robert E. Hall, Intertemporal Substitution in
Consumption, 96 J. OF POL. ECON. 339, 341 (1988); Oscar Lange, The Foundations of
Welfare Economics, 10 ECONOMETRICA 215, 217 (1942).
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purchase P1 instead of P2.19 Such change is known as the substitution effect,
the tendency to replace behavior that is subject to a relatively heavy tax
burden with behavior that is subject to a relatively light tax burden.20 The
increased demand for P2 and the decreased demand for P1 will cause the
price of P2 to rise and the price of P1 to fall. Producers will respond by
shifting to the production of P2 some factors of productions (land, labor,
and so forth) that had been used to produce P1. As the supply of P2
increases and the supply of P1 decreases, the price of P1 will rise and the
price of P2 will fall. Eventually, a new equilibrium will be reached. This
will occur, let us assume, when the pretax market price of P1 is eight times
than of P2 and the post-tax price of P1 is twelve times that of P2. At that
point, those factors of production that can produce more than eight times as
much P2 as P1 will be used to produce P2, those factors of production that
can produce less than eight times as much P2 as P1 will be used to produce
P1, those consumers for whom P1 is worth more than twelve times as much
as P2 will purchase P1, and those consumers for whom P1 is worth less than
twelve times as much as P2 will purchase P2. In other words, the MRS (as
expressed by consumer preferences) is 12:1, while the MRT is 8:1. Because
of this discrepancy, the market is no longer operating efficiently: too few
factors of production are being used to produce P1 and too many factors and
being used to produce P2. Due to the tax, factors of production are no longer
being used most efficiently to satisfy consumer demand.
In contrast, assume that instead of imposing an excise tax on one
product only, the government were to impose a tax on all consumer
products, so that consumers are unable to avoid the tax by switching from
one product to another. Because the relative demand for various consumer
goods will remain the same as it was prior to the imposition of taxation, the
relative prices of those goods will remain the same, and consequently there
will be no incentive to move factors of production from one consumer good
to another. If before the imposition of the tax, the MRS of the various goods
19

The tax will not affect the behavior of consumers for whom P 1 is worth less than ten
times as much as P 2, nor that of consumers who consider P1 to be worth more than fifteen
times as much as P2. The former would have purchased P 2 before the imposition of the tax
and will continue to do so after the imposition of the tax; the latter would have purchased P 1
before the imposition of the excise and will continue to do so after the imposition of the tax.
20 Rosanne Altshuler, The Case for Fundamental Tax Reform, 21 KAN. J.L. & P UB.
POL’Y 399, 400 (2012); DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION
OF THEORY TO POLICY 39 (9th ed. 2008); Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and
Consumer Protection, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 218, 233 (2010); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures,
Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 4 (2011); Susannah Camic Tahk,
Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2685 (2013); Binh
Tran-Nam, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification: Some Conceptual Issues and a Preliminary
Assessment, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 500 (1999); Susanah Camic Tahk, Public Choice Theory
and Earmarked Taxes, 68 TAX L. REV. 755, 758-59 (2015); James P. Ziliak, Taxes and
Labor Supply, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 235 (Joseph J. Cordes,
Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle, eds., 2005).
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equaled their MRT, the equilibrium will hold after the imposition of tax. To
demonstrate, let us return to our previous example but now assume that P 1
and P2 are subject to the same rate of tax. Although the after-tax price of
both products will rise, P1 will continue to cost ten times that of P2, factors
of production that can produce more than ten times as much P2 as P1 will be
used to produce P2, and factors of production that can produce less than ten
times as much P2 as P1 will be used to produce P1. The MRS (as expressed
by consumer preferences) of P1 for P2 and the MRT of P1 for P2 will each
remain 10:1.
Nevertheless, the fact that the broad-based tax is more neutral and thus
more economically efficient than the narrow-based tax does not mean that
the former is completely neutral and that it does not entail any deadweight
loss. For instance, the higher prices of consumer goods following the
imposition of tax could cause individuals to favor leisure over wages. Thus,
while the tax may not affect the trade-off of one consumer good for another,
it may affect the work/leisure trade-off and lead to inefficiency in the labor
market (as in our previous example of Adrienne and Bruce).21
The conclusion that when relative after-tax prices differ from relative
pretax prices then factors of production will be used in an inefficient
manner is relevant not only for consumer goods and for wages, but also for
rates of return to capital investment. The effect of taxation on the relative
return to capital investment will prove particularly significant for our
discussion of neutrality in the context of international taxation. However,
for the moment, we will continue to consider only the domestic arena.
Investments exploit resources and produce goods. A higher rate of return
indicates a greater capacity to transform economic resources into goods that
consumers value. In a no-tax world, capital will thus tend to flow to those
investments that most efficiently utilize resources.
The introduction of taxation can disrupt this equilibrium. The key
point here is that although efficiency is reflected in relative pretax returns,
capital will flow to those investments with highest after-tax returns. If
different types of investments are subject to differing tax burdens, then
capital may be used in an inefficient manner. As an example, assume that
the expected pretax return from investing in pharmaceutical research is 12%
and that the expected pretax return from real estate development is 10%.
21 The fact that consumer goods now cost more than they did before the imposition of
the tax may cause individuals to work more so as to be able to afford the goods that they
need. This phenomenon is known as the income effect. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX
POLICY 76 (5th ed. 1987); Ziliak, supra note 20. From a statistical perspective, the income
effect can mask the extent of the substitution effect. For example, an empirical observation
that a broad-based tax on wages or on consumer goods does not affect labor supply does not
justify the conclusion that there is no substitution effect and that the tax entail no deadweight
loss. There might be a substantial substitution effect along with a substantial deadweight
loss. All that one may reasonably conclude from the data is that the substitution effect equals
the income effect. STEPHEN W. SMITH, LABOUR ECONOMICS 12 (1994); Ziliak, supra note 20
at 235.
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Assume further that the former is subject to a higher effective tax rate than
is the latter, so that the expected after-tax returns are 7% and 9%,
respectively. The discrepancy between the relative pretax returns and the
relative after-tax returns will lead to underinvestment in pharmaceutical
research and overinvestment in real estate development to the detriment of
aggregate societal welfare. The principle of neutrality posits that it is only
when the various investment alternatives are subject to the same rate of tax
that the tax will not affect investor behavior and will not misdirect capital.22
In our example, if investments in pharmaceutical research and investments
in real estate development were both subject to an equivalent effective tax
burden of, say, 40%, then the former would produce an after-tax return of
7.2% and the latter would produce an after-tax return of 6%. As the aftertax ranking is the same as the pretax ranking, the tax would not affect the
ability of the market to direct resources to their most efficient uses.
The principle of neutrality is probably the least controversial of the
three traditional linchpins of domestic tax theory.23 Vertical equity – the
idea that those who are better off should bear a greater tax burden than
those who are not as well off – is the subject of vociferous philosophical
and political debate. Not only are there those who disagree with the entire
concept of redistribution,24 but even among those who do believe that
redistribution of wealth is a legitimate aim of the tax system there is no
confluence of opinion regarding the appropriate extent of redistribution.
Horizontal equity – the idea that taxpayers who are equally well-off should
bear equivalent tax burdens – may have strong intuitive appeal, but there is
a serious doubt as to whether it has any cogent normative basis.25 In
22 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do
Misallocations Drive Out Inequities, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 735, 739-40 (1979).
23 The three dominant motifs in modern tax theory are horizontal equity, vertical equity,
and neutrality. See, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44 (2006); Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 5-7 (2013); Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative
Field: Putting Critical Tax Scholarship in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (1998);
Suellen M. Wolfe, Recovery from Halper: The Pain from Additions to Tax is Not the Sting of
Punishment, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 161, 179-80 (1996).
24 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 283-305 (1985); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 40-44 (2d
ed. 2007); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 802-07 (1998);
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974).
25 See generally, e.g., Elkins, supra note 23; Brain Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1323 (2008); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191
(1992); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX
J. 139 (1989); Ira K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity,
19 FLA. TAX REV. 79 (2016); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993); Richard A.
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); Richard A.
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990); James Repetti &
Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012).

13

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:1 (2019)

contrast, all would presumably agree that a tax that does not interfere with
market incentives is preferable to one that discourages the effective use of
resources. The only legitimate debate with regard to neutrality is how to
rank it when it conflicts with some other goal of the tax system. For
example, reasonable minds may well differ regarding the relative merits of
two alternative tax regimes, one of which is less neutral but more vertically
equitable than the other.26 However, it is incontrovertible that, all else being
equal, taxes should be designed to be as neutral as possible.
B. Pigouvian Taxation
Our discussion of neutrality in domestic tax theory is subject to one
important caveat. The principle of neutrality does not apply to Pigouvian
taxation. Pigouvian taxes – named after the British economist Cecil Pigou
who first proposed them in 1920 – are a means by which the government
can attempt to overcome the problem of externalities, a phenomenon that
can prevent the market from achieving an efficient allocation of resources.27
Actions (or omissions) often impose costs on third parties. If the
cumulative cost imposed on third parties is greater than the benefit that the
parties to the action can themselves procure from their behavior, the
consequence of individuals and firms pursuing their own self-interest will
be a net reduction in total societal welfare. For example, assume that a firm
is considering the construction of a noise-producing factory near a
residential neighborhood. In making its decision, it will account for the cost
of building and operating the factory and the income that the factory is
expected to produce. It will have no economic incentive to consider the
effect of the construction and operation of the factory on the welfare of its
neighbors. Thus, if the income that the factory is expected to produce is
greater than the costs that the firm expects to incur – including direct costs,
time value of money, opportunity costs, and so forth – then the firm will
likely go ahead and construct the factory. However, if the disturbance to the
neighbors is greater than the benefit that the firm expects to procure – in
economic terms, if the minimum amount that the neighbors would
cumulatively agree to receive as compensation for being disturbed by the
noise is greater than the amount that the firm would be willing to pay for
the right to operate the factory – then the factory would bring about a net
reduction of societal welfare. Externalities such as the noise pollution
produced by the factory present a challenge to one of the primary
26

Neutrality may also conflict with other principles besides those traditionally
associated with tax theory. For example, Rawls rejected what economic and legal literature
refer to as an endowment tax (and which Rawls called a “head tax”), a tax one of whose
principal virtues is its respect for neutrality. His primary objection was that such a tax
interferes with liberty. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 157-58 (Erin
Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2003); John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 QUAR. J. OF
ECON. 633, 654-55 (1974).
27 See A. C. PIGOU, M.A., THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1932).
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justifications for reliance on the market to allocate resources: that
individuals operating in their own best interests will cumulatively promote
overall welfare.28
One means by which the government can contend with this type of
market failure is to prohibit or otherwise limit behavior that entails
significant negative externalities. In our example, it might prohibit noise
above a certain decibel level within a certain radius of residential
neighborhoods. However, there are a number of problems with this
approach. The first is that focusing on the externality – as government
regulation tends to do, proscribing the behavior when the negative
externality is great and permitting the behavior when the negative
externality is small – misses the bigger picture. In order to ascertain the
effect of the action of overall societal welfare, the government would need
to assess not only the extent of the externality but also the expected benefit
that the parties to the action expect to procure. If, and only if, the absolute
value of the former is greater than the absolute value of the latter would
prohibition be appropriate. In our example, if, and only if, the profits that
the firm expects to earn are less than the cumulative discomfort experienced
by the neighbors would it be appropriate to prohibit the construction or
operation of the factory. Such fine-tuning is ordinarily beyond the capacity
of non-tax regulation. Thus, a ban on activity that involves significant
negative externalities would prevent that activity even in those cases in
which the benefit is greater than the cost, and vice versa. A second problem
with proscribe-or-permit regulation is that, even if it were possible to
determine expected benefit and compare it to the expected externality, a
finding that the benefit exceeds the cost and the action should therefore be
permitted would involve distributive injustice as it would permit the
enrichment of some at the expense of others.
To overcome both the allocative and the distributive problems
encountered by proscribe-or-permit regulation, Pigou proposed that the
government should impose a tax that would quantify the negative
externalities generated by the taxpayer’s behavior.29 Returning to our
example, the government could impose a tax on those who produce noise in
or near residential neighborhoods, scaling the tax to reflect the degree, the
hour, and the duration of the noise and the number of individuals affected.
The amount of the tax would ideally reflect the psychic cost imposed on the
neighbors, that is, the amount that they would be willing to receive in
exchange for bearing the noise pollution. If properly constructed, a
28 Adam Smith, Of Restraints Upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of Such
Goods as Can Be Produced at Home, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 347, 349 (1776) (“. . . [B]y directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, [every individual] intends only his own gain, and he
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention.”).
29 See PIGOU, supra note 27, at 192.
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Pigouvian tax would force market actors to internalize the externalities of
their behavior and to determine on an individualized basis whether the
benefit they hope to procure is worth the cost. Pursuing their own selfinterest, they would use communal resources if, and only if, the use of such
resources would serve to promote overall societal welfare. No less
importantly, those who do undertake such behavior would be forced to
compensate the rest of society for their use of those communal resources.30
Does the principle of neutrality have a role to play in the design of
Pigouvian taxation? As we saw, the reasoning underlying the principle of
neutrality is that (a) the market is an efficient allocator of resources, (b)
taxes cause people to change their behavior as a way of avoiding the tax, (c)
the substitution effect creates a deadweight loss that decreases social
welfare, and (d) taxes should therefore be designed so as to limit the
substitution effect. However, three of these four propositions are inaccurate
with regard to Pigouvian taxation.31 Where externalities are present, the
market is not an efficient allocator of resources. The Pigouvian tax is a
means of overcoming this type of market failure by forcing the
internalization of those externalities. Like other taxes, Pigouvian taxes
encourage people to change their behavior. However, the fact that people
will modify their behavior in light of the tax by opting for less heavily taxed
courses of action over more heavily taxed courses of action than they would
otherwise have chosen is hardly a censurable feature of Pigouvian taxation.
On the contrary, a significant substitution effect indicates that the
previously unaccounted-for externality constituted a serious impediment to
achieving an efficient allocation. Thus, the more that a properly constituted
Pigouvian tax induces behavior modification, the greater the justification
for its enactment. In other words, a neutral Pigouvian tax is a contradiction
in terms.32
Focusing now on the rate of return from investment, we saw that with
regard to non-Pigouvian taxation, it is the pretax return that determines
efficiency. Consequently, when relative after-tax returns differ from relative
pretax returns, capital will be misdirected. In the case of Pigouvian taxation,
the opposite is true: it is the after-tax return, not the pretax return, that
determines efficiency. For instance, assume that the firm constructing the
factory in our previous example expects a return on investment of 15% and
that constructing the factory in the best alternative venue would produce an
30 Ideally, the government would make the affected neighbors economically whole by
transferring to each a portion of the tax revenue. In the absence of direct transfer payments,
members of the local population will receive indirect compensation as the government will
be able to use the tax revenue to provide additional public services or to reduce their tax
liability.
31 The only proposition that holds for Pigouvian taxation is (b).
32 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1048 (1992) (“. . . [A]
Pigouvian tax . . . will not meet the traditional static distributive test of neutrality.”).
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expected return of 12%. In a no-tax world, it would construct the factory
near the residential population. Now assume that the government imposes a
tax on noise pollution, that the tax properly quantifies the welfare loss by
those affected by the noise, and that the tax reduces the expected return
from a factory constructed need a residential neighborhood from 15% to
10%. Although in a no-tax world the return on investment from
constructing the factory near the residential neighborhood would be higher
than in the best alternative venue, after the imposition of the tax, the return
from the former would be less than the return from the latter. As what
dictates firms’ behavior is the after-tax return on their investments, the firm
in our scenario would presumably decide to construct the factory in the
alternative venue. However, the fact that following the imposition of the tax
the firm will choose a different course of action than it would have in the
absence of taxation is hardly an indictment of the Pigouvian tax.
Considering the welfare of everyone concerned – the neighbors, the firm’s
stakeholders, the firm’s customers, and so forth – it is apparent that the
alternative venue will better promote aggregate social welfare, and this fact
is reflected in the greater after-tax return available from that venue.
Summing up our brief discussion of neutrality in domestic taxation, we
need to distinguish between non-Pigouvian and Pigouvian taxes. With
regard to non-Pigouvian taxation, the pretax return reflects allocative
efficiency, and neutrality is therefore a relevant principle in the design of
non-Pigouvian taxes. With regard to Pigouvian taxation, it is not the pretax
return but the after-tax return that is determinative of allocative efficiency.
Consequently, the type of neutrality discussed here has no role to play in
the design of Pigouvian taxes.33
III. THE TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
Writers in the field of international taxation tend to rely upon the
principle of neutrality without first examining whether it is applicable in the
international context. For example, the OECD’s report on Harmful Tax
Competition, a report that later served as the background for the OECD’s
BEPS project, states that:
. . . [T]he proposals set out in this Report, although not covering all
aspects of tax competition, will further promote these objectives by
reducing the distortionary influence of taxation…thereby promoting
fair competition for real economic activities. If governments can
agree that these location[al] decisions should be driven by economic
considerations and not primarily by tax factors, this will help move
toward[] the “level playing field” which is so essential to the

33

The very classification of Pigouvian taxes as “taxes” is questionable. See infra Part

IV.B.
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continued expansion of global economic growth. 34

In other words, in designing the international tax regime, we should
strive to neutralize the effect of taxation on investment decisions so that
capital can flow to its most productive venue. This assumption, which
underlies much of the discourse in the field of international taxation,
deserves to be examined critically.
However, before we can do so, we need to clarify what is meant by
international taxation. The problem here is that the literature employs the
term international taxation as a catchall phrase to describe what are
essentially a number of very distinct concepts. It is essential to distinguish
among them, as each requires its own set of analytical tools. Principles that
are appropriate to one of these concepts may be useless or
counterproductive if applied to another. This is particularly true with regard
to the principle of neutrality. Within the framework of one type of
international tax regime, neutrality is a useful measure for promoting
efficiency. Within the framework of another type of international tax
regime, striving for neutrality would likely inhibit the achievement of an
efficient allocation of resources. However, because commenters and
policymakers refer indiscriminately to all types of international tax regimes
under the overbroad category of international taxation, they tend to ignore
the unique aspects of each and, in the name of promoting global welfare, to
rely upon the principle of neutrality in instances when doing so would in
fact be detrimental to global welfare.
This Part will consider the three usages of the term ‘international
taxation,’ usages that I will refer to as ‘intranational taxation,’
‘supranational taxation,’ and ‘inter-jurisdictional taxation.’ Part IV will then
consider the neutrality principle in each type of international tax regime.
A. Intranational Taxation
One use of the term international taxation – what I will refer to as
intranational taxation – describes the international scope of an individual
jurisdiction’s tax laws.35 In the context of income taxation, whether to tax
the foreign-source income of nonresident citizens36 and whether (and at
34 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue, at 9 (1998), www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf.
35 See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, DIANE M. RING & YARIV BRAUNER, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 1 (4th ed. 2019).
36 Citizens of the United States, including those residing abroad, are liable for U.S. tax
on their worldwide income. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines gross
income as “all income from whatever source derived,” is not qualified with regard to the
identity of the taxpayer or the geographical source of the income. Section 871 stipulates that,
in the case of nonresident aliens, gross income includes only U.S.-source income (or income
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States).
Section 882(b) contains a similar provision with regard to foreign corporations. As neither of
these sections applies to nonresident citizens, they are subject to the Section 61 default rule.
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what rate) to tax the domestic-source income of nonresidents (or of
nonresident aliens)37 are questions of intranational taxation. However,
intranational taxation is not restricted to income taxation. Every tax must,
explicitly or implicitly, provide rules for the international scope of the tax
and must therefore possess an international tax regime. A property tax
might apply to all property in the jurisdiction regardless of the residence of
the property owner, or it might apply only to resident-owned property. A
sales or purchase tax might apply to all sales of goods within the
jurisdiction, or it might exempt sales or purchases by nonresidents (or by
nonresidents who do not maintain a physical presence or an economic
nexus within the jurisdiction).38 Furthermore, if residence is relevant, the
law would need to determine who is to be considered a resident and who is
to be considered a non-resident for the purpose of that particular tax. If the
location of property or the place in which where property is sold is relevant,
the law would need to determine the situs of property or the place of sale
for the purpose of that particular tax, and so forth. The reason that I refer to
this type of regime as intranational taxation is that the source of these rules
is the domestic law of the taxing jurisdiction.
The need for intranational tax rules is not premised on the existence or
reach of other jurisdictions’ tax regimes. Even if no other country collected
taxes, any legislation imposing taxes would, explicitly or implicitly, include
an intranational tax regime. When other jurisdictions do impose taxes, and
particularly when they impose taxes of a similar nature (e.g., on income, on
property, or on sales), the jurisdiction concerned will need to consider the
effects of the foreign tax on domestic tax liability. The spectrum of options
for treating foreign tax liability is extraordinary broad. On the one extreme,
the law may simply ignore the fact that other jurisdictions impose taxes. On
the other extreme, it may provide a complete exemption any time a foreign
jurisdiction imposes taxes. More moderate – and more common – responses
See I.R.C., §§ 61, 871, 882(b) (Westlaw 2017). JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 9 (3d ed. 2010). The United States taxes the foreign-source income of nonresident aliens. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L.
REV. 483, 487-90 (2004). For discussion of the appropriateness of taxing nonresident
citizens, see Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad:
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117 (2014); Michael S. Kirsch,
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (2007); Ruth Mason,
Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016); Bernard Schneider, The End of
Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2012);
Daniel
Shaviro,
Taxing
Potential
Members’
Foreign
Source
Income,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625732 (2015); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile,
96 IOWA L. REV. 1289 (2010).
37 See I.R.C. §§ 871-72 (non-resident aliens) (Westlaw 2017); Id. at §§ 881-82 (foreign
corporations) (Westlaw 2017).
38 For the constitutionality of states imposing sales tax on nonresident vendors, see
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018), overruling Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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include a credit or a deduction for foreign taxes.39
Note that, because the rules of intranational taxation vary from one
jurisdiction to another and from one tax to another, the term intranational
taxation is devoid of substantive meaning without the name of a jurisdiction
and a tax attached to it. For instance, the question ‘What are the
intranational tax rules of Canadian income tax (or of Brazilian property
tax)?’ admits of an answer. The question ‘What are the rules of
intranational taxation?’ does not.40
A further distinction that we need to make within the context of
intranational taxation is between the taxation of residents on their foreign
property or foreign economic activity on the one hand and the taxation of
nonresidents on their domestic property or domestic economic activity on
the other. In the context of income taxation, these two categories of tax are
often referred to as “outbound” and “inbound,” respectively.41 Adopting
that terminology, one may refer to the imposition of tax by a country on the
foreign property or foreign economic activity of its residents as “outbound
intranational taxation” and to the imposition of tax by a country on the
domestic property or economic activity of nonresidents as “inbound
intranational taxation.” In the discussion that follows, I will focus primarily
on the taxation that countries impose on the economic activity of nonresidents. Thus, the term intranational taxation, unless otherwise specified,
refers to inbound intranational taxation.
B. Supranational Taxation
The term international taxation is also used to describe a tax that is
imposed not by an individual jurisdiction, but by a supranational entity. I
will refer to this type of tax as supranational taxation. The purest case of
supranational taxation would be tax imposed by a hypothetical global
39 The United States ordinarily provides a credit for foreign income taxes paid. I.R.C. §
901 (Westlaw 2017). The OECD model treaty recognizes both the exemption method and
the credit method. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Model Tax Convention on
income and on Capital, at 376-406 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-taxconvention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en#page1.
40 On its own, the term intranational taxation does have formal meaning. As described in
the text, the term denoted the rules adopted by a jurisdiction to determine the international
scope of a particular tax. It has no substantive meaning as the rules vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from tax to tax. For a discussion of the difference between substantive or
concrete rules and formal rules, see CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE
PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 15 (John Petrie trans., 1963) (“The question is to find a formula of
justice which is common to the different conceptions we have analysed. This formula must
contain an indeterminate element—what in mathematics is called a variable—the
determination of which will give now one, now another, conception of justice. The common
idea will constitute a definition of formal or abstract justice. Each particular or concrete
formula of justice will constitute one of the innumerable values of formal justice”)
(emphases in the original).
41 ISENBERGH, supra note 36, at 4.
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government in a world in which individual countries did not exist.42 Less
extreme examples of a supranational tax – also hitherto unimplemented but
whose adoption is presumably more likely than is the dissolution of
individual countries and the emergence of a world government – include
proposals for taxing electronic commerce, foreign-exchange markets, and
carbon emissions.43
Needless to say, in practice supranational taxes are rare. One
conceptually controversial example of supranational taxation might be
those taxes collected by the European Union. Under the relevant provisions
of EU law, the EU receives custom duties from goods entering the EU, a
percentage of each member state’s gross national income, and a portion of
the value added tax collected by each member state.44 However, the
classification of EU taxes as supranational is problematic. It is arguable that
the EU should not be viewed as a supranational entity but rather as
something more akin to a weak federal (or confederal) state.45 From this
perspective, the distribution of tax revenue between the EU and its member
states and the collection of tax on goods entering the territory of the EU
would not be examples of supranational taxation, but simply facets of
European domestic taxation.46
Perhaps a better example of an existing supranational tax would be the
42

See, e.g., 2 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF
JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 287 (1884) (proposing a
supranational tax to fund an international body with powers resembling those of a global
federated state).
43 See, e.g., TONY ADDISON, GEORGE MAVROTAS & MARK MCGILLIVRAY, WORLD INST.
FOR DEV. ECON. RES., DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: EVIDENCE
AND GLOBAL POLICY AGENDAS, at 11-13 (2005); Rifat Azam, Global Taxation of CrossBorder E-Commerce Income, 31 VA. TAX REV. 639 (2012); Bernard P. Herber & Jose T.
Raga, An International Carbon Tax to Combat Global Warming: An Economic and Political
Analysis of the European Union Proposal, 54 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOL. 257 (1995); U.N.
DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY 2012: IN SEARCH OF
NEW DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.C.1 (2012).
44 European Parliamentary Research Service, Own Resources of the European Union:
Reforming the EU’s Financing System, at 2 (Nov. 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630265/EPRSBRI(2018)630265_EN.pdf.
45 MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: THE BUILDING OF EUROPE,
1950-2000 49 (2000) (“Our theoretical analysis suggests that the EC/EU is neither a
federation nor a confederation in the classic sense. But it does claim that the European
political and economic elites have shaped and moulded [sic] the EC/EU into a new form of
international organization, namely a species of ‘new’ confederation.”); Jean Michel Josselin
& Alain Marciano, The Political Economy of European Federalism 3-4 (Ctr. For Res. In
Econ. & Mgmt., Pub. Econ. & Soc. Choice Working Paper WP 2006-07, 2006),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080819213748/http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2006/ie200607.pdf (“[T]he European Union is mainly a confederation but it already contains
elements of a federation.”).
46 It is not even an issue of intranational taxation as its primary concern is not the
international scope of European tax law, but rather the distribution of tax revenue between
the two levels of government.
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dues paid by member states to the United Nations. Under the arrangements
currently in force, dues are calculated as a function of the country’s gross
national product and then adjusted to reflect per capita income and external
debt.47 While described as ‘dues’ and theoretically voluntary (as they apply
only to member states) that are members of the international body, both the
fact that refraining from membership in the UN may not be a practical
option48 and the formula by which the dues are calculated mean that these
dues are least very similar to, and in many ways effectively function as, a
supranational tax.
While supranational taxes are rare, if they exist at all, defining the
term, understanding the nature of supranational tax, and distinguishing
between supranational taxation and other types of taxes that are commonly
grouped together under the heading of international taxation, is important
for our discussion. When discussing intranational taxation (or interjurisdictional tax, a term that will be defined shortly), the literature tends to
apply the norms and principles that rationally should apply to supranational
taxation but that are inappropriate with regard to intranational or to interjurisdictional taxation. Identifying and understanding the concept of
supranational taxation, the principles that would apply to it were it to exist,
and why those principles would apply will help clarify which principles are
and which principles are not relevant with respect to intranational and interjurisdictional taxation.
C. Inter-jurisdictional Taxation
A third sense of the term international taxation, which I will refer to as
inter-jurisdictional taxation, involves attempts by countries to coordinate
their intranational tax regimes. In the early to mid-twentieth century, the
focus of inter-jurisdictional taxation was the prevention of double taxation,
the imposition of tax on the same income by a number of jurisdictions. 49
47 In any case, no country will contribute more than 22% or less than 0.001% of the
United Nation’s budget. G.A. Res. 73/271, ¶¶ 6 (f), (h) (Dec. 22, 2018); Rakesh Dubbudu,
How Much Do Various Counties Contribute to the UN Budget? FACTLY (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://factly.in/united-nations-budget-contributions-by-member-countries/.
48 Even perennially neutral Switzerland finally joined the United Nations in 2002. Rory
Carroll, Switzerland Decides to Join UN, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2002),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/04/unitednations (Switzerland’s referendum
on joining the United Nation “billed as a battle for the country’s soul.”).
49 See REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION SUBMITTED TO THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY PROFESSORS BRUINS, EINAUDI, SELIGMAN AND SIR JOSIAH STAMP
(1923), reprinted in 4 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 4003 (1962) [hereinafter League of Nation’s Report on Double
Taxation]. See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (1977) [hereinafter OECD 1977 Model Convention on
Double Taxation], https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-double-taxation-conventionon-income-and-capital_9789264055919-en#page1. In addition to the fact that the later
document’s title refers explicitly and exclusively to “double taxation,” it also proposes the
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One motivation for such efforts was a fear that the threat of double taxation
would inhibit the development of international trade.50 By the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries, the focus of inter-jurisdictional taxation
had shifted from preventing double taxation to preventing what the OECD
refers to as “double non-taxation,” the phenomenon of multi-national
corporations not paying tax in any jurisdiction or bearing an extraordinarily
low overall tax burden.51 The OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) is one example of an attempt to forge an interjurisdictional tax regime.52
It is important to distinguish between the branch of law to which interjurisdictional taxation belongs and the subject matter of inter-jurisdictional
taxation. From the perspective of the legal norms to which it conforms,
inter-jurisdictional taxation belongs to the field of public international law.
For instance, the primary means by which countries coordinate their
intranational tax regimes is by entering into bilateral or, more rarely, multinational tax treaties.53 As international treaties, tax treaties are part of
following as a title for treaties executed between nations and based on the model language:
“Convention between (State A) and (State B) for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital.” Id. at 1, 23.
50 See League of Nation’s Report on Double Taxation, supra note 49, at 4009-21.
51 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Crisis, supra note 2; Rifat Azam, Minimum Global Effective
Corporate Tax Rate as General Anti-Avoidance Rule, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 4, 49 (2017);
Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1307, 131819 (2013); Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises By
Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV.
619, 626-32 (2009); Jasmine M. Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 338, 342 (2014); GRAETZ, supra note 2;
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FL. TAX REV. 699 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard,
The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2012); Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine
Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will it Last? Will it Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 37 (2003); Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand Unified Global Income
Tax, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 361 (2013). See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
(2017). As opposed to the 1977 model, see OECD 1977 Model Convention on Double
Taxation, supra note 49, the title of the 2017 convention does not include the term “double
taxation” and adopts instead the more neutral phraseology, “with respect to taxes.” More
significantly, the 2017 model proposes as a title for bilateral treaties, “Convention between
(State A) and (State B) for the Elimination of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital and the Prevention of Tax Evasion and Avoidance” (emphasis
added). ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO
TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL 27 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-taxconvention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en#page28.
52 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN OF BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf; Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], BEPS 2015 Final Reports (2015), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/9789264263437en.pdf?expires=1571708218&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=AC7F6F21A6D6D70BFA
45C9244294D7D0.
53 There are currently more than 2,000 international tax treaties in force. AVI-YONAH ET
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conventional international law and are consequently subject to the rules that
govern the validity, form, and interpretation of international treaties.54 In
the context of U.S. constitutional law, treaties, once ratified by the Senate,
have the status of statutory law.55 Conflicts between treaties and other
legislation are resolved in accordance with the ordinary rules of statutory
interpretation and in particular the rule that when two statutes conflict, the
provision enacted later in time prevails.56 This rule is the source of
Congress’ constitutional authority to override treaty provisions through
subsequent legislation.57 While a legislative override constitutes a violation
of a conventional obligation undertaken by the United States and is
expressly prohibited by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 58
for the purpose of U.S. domestic law, the override is effective.59
Another example of how inter-jurisdictional taxation belongs to the
field of the international law is the question of whether the common
practice of taxing the worldwide income of residents and the domesticsource income of nonresidents is simply a matter of international usage or
has acquired the status of customary international law. In accordance with
the rules of international law, the answer depends upon whether countries
refrain from taxing the foreign-source income of nonresidents because of
the belief that customary international law prohibits them from doing so. If
it can be shown that countries refraining from taxing foreign-source income
are motivated by such a belief, then the practice would constitute customary
international law and states would be precluded under international law
from taxing the foreign-source income of foreigners. If those countries are
not motivated by such a belief, then taxing the foreign-source income of
foreign residents, while perhaps unusual and at variance from international
AL.,

supra note 35, at 1.
See, e.g., Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX &
BUS. L. 1 (1986).
55 U.S. CONST., art. VI.
56 See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 195 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
57 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 112 U.S. at 600.
58 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty.”). The Vienna Convention is considered a declarative treaty (codifying
pre-existing customary international law). Consequently, even countries – such as the United
States – that are not parties to the convention are nonetheless bound by its terms. See also,
e.g., Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 1980 Digest § 7, at 1041, n.43, cited in Andrew M.
Beato, Newly Independent and Separating States’ Succession to Treaties: Considerations on
the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 9 AM U.J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y, 525, 533 n.31 (1994) (the United States government considers the Vienna
Convention “declarative of customary international law”).
59 I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (Westlaw 2017) (“For purposes of determining the relationship
between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue, neither
the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law.”).
54

24

Neutrality in International Taxation
40:1 (2019)

usage, would not constitute a violation of international customary law. 60
However, for the purpose of our discussion, what is important is not
the form but rather the content of inter-jurisdictional taxation. While interjurisdictional taxation is a branch of international law, its subject matter is
the regulation and co-ordination of the various countries’ intranational tax
regimes.
D. The Substance of Semantics
As already noted, the literature in the field of international taxation
tends to employ the term international taxation indiscriminately to refer to
intranational taxation, supranational taxation, and inter-jurisdictional
taxation. The common attribute of these three concepts is that they are all
concerned with international aspects of taxation. In other words, in a world
in which persons, capital, goods, and services did not cross borders, there
would be no practical need for intranational or inter-jurisdictional taxation
and the chance that any sort of supranational tax would be adopted would
be even more remote than it is in our world.61 It is only because countries
are not isolated entities that it is necessary to delineate the international
reach of a country’s tax regime, attempt to coordinate individual countries’
tax regimes, and consider the possibility that a supranational tax regime is
even fathomable.62
However, these similarities are largely superficial. In substance,
intranational taxation, inter-jurisdictional taxation, and supranational
taxation are fundamentally different concepts. One particularly significant
way in which they differ is the degree to which neutrality – developed
within the framework of domestic taxation – is a proper goal of the tax
systems. The failure to distinguish among these three very different
60 See, e.g., Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29
L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 148 n.23 (1998); H. David Rosenbloom, The David R.
Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX
L. REV. 137, 166 (2000); see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Does Customary
International Tax Law Exist? L. & Econ. Working Papers (2019),
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1271&context=law_econ_curr
ent; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., To What Degree Does Customary International Law Require
Accommodation of a Source Country’s Right to Tax High, Tax Low or Not Tax at All?, in A
COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMERITUS PROFESSOR GABRIËL A.
MOENS (Augusto Zimmermann ed., 2018).
61 Although anachronistic, this model of a closed society forms the basis of much
contemporary social philosophy. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 577 (1996)
(“This fundamental relation of citizenship has two special features: first, it is relation of
citizens within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter only by birth and exit only
by death . . . .”).
62 Even social philosophers who support the concept of international distributive justice
tend to accept that the norms of distributive justice would not apply if countries were indeed
closed systems. See, e.g. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 136-169 (1979); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 240 (1989).
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concepts has led both scholars and policy-makers to attempt to apply the
principle of neutrality in an inappropriate manner and is one of the sources
of the incoherence prevalent in the current discourse on international
taxation.
IV. NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
Part II analyzed the principle of neutrality as it applies in the domestic
arena. Part III described the three types of tax regimes commonly grouped
together under the overbroad title of international taxation. This Part will
consider whether the principle of neutrality as developed in the context of
domestic taxation is applicable in the international arena.
As one might expect, we will discover that there is no monolithic
answer to this question. Because the different types of international tax
regimes are conceptually distinct, the principles appropriate to each will
also differ.
A. Supranational Taxation
For the purpose of our discussion, the existence or even the political
and practical feasibility of a supranational regime is not particularly
relevant. The importance of discussing the role that neutrality would play in
such a regime is not that one is likely to be adopted in the foreseeable
future, but rather to compare and contrast the role of neutrality in a
supranational tax regime with its role in either an intranational tax and
inter-jurisdictional tax regime. The literature – which indiscriminately
includes all three regimes within the single catchall phrase international
taxation – tends to apply principles to intranational and to interjurisdictional tax regimes that are inappropriate, but would be appropriate
to a supranational tax regime. By analyzing how neutrality would apply to a
supranational regime, we will be better able to discern why it is
inapplicable to intranational and inter-jurisdictional regimes.
As a rule, the principles of tax theory as they were developed in the
purely domestic arena would (or should) provide appropriate guidance for
the framers of a supranational tax regime. The reason that domestic tax
theory is applicable in the supranational context is that purely domestic
taxation and supranational taxation share the same theoretical background
conditions. In each case, the implicit context is a closed economic system
with a tax regime that is not in competition with other tax systems. More
significantly, in each case, the taxing authority owes a fiduciary duty to the
taxpaying public: the taxing authority has no legitimate independent desire
for tax revenue other than what is necessary to promote the welfare of the
taxpaying public itself.63 In other words, if the theory of purely domestic
63 The fiduciary duty of domestic and supranational taxing authorities vis-à-vis the
taxpaying public is explained in more depth in our discussion of intranational taxation, see
infra subpart B.
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taxation concerns the principles of taxation that would apply to an ‘island
country,’ then the theory of supranational taxation concerns the principles
of taxation that would apply to an ‘island planet.’ The only difference
between purely domestic taxation and supranational taxation is the size of
the relevant jurisdiction.
Consider a supranational entity charged with raising funds, say for the
purpose of supplying international public goods or redistributing global
wealth. In designing the structure of its tax system, the supranational entity,
like its domestic counterpart, would need to consider the possible economic
side effects of any tax it imposed. Specifically, as in the domestic context,
the tax would likely induce taxpayers to change their behavior, and the
resulting deadweight loss would reduce aggregate global welfare.64 This
would most clearly be the case if those subject to the supranational tax were
individuals and private firms (their response to a supranational tax would be
similar to their response to a similarly constituted domestic tax). It would
also hold if those subject to the tax were countries. For example, suppose
that the supranational entity was to impose on each country a tax equal to a
percentage of its government’s annual budget. The result would be that the
cost to a country of supplying domestic public goods or of redistributing
domestic wealth would be greater than in the absence of the supranational
taxation. If the supranational tax rate were substantial enough, countries
might reduce the goods that they supply their residents and lessen their
domestic redistributive efforts. For instance, assume that a country is
considering imposing a tax of $1 billion on its residents in order to fund
investment in its infrastructure. It calculates that the aggregate benefit that
its residents would derive from such investment is greater than $1 billion.
However, implementing the project would increase its national budget by
$1 billion and would therefore subject it to additional supranational taxation
of $1 billion times the tax rate. If, after factoring in the additional
supranational tax, the cost turns out to be greater than the benefit, the
project would likely be abandoned. The deadweight loss is the difference
between the benefit that residents would have derived from the project and
the cost of the project in the absence of supranational tax.
Like in the domestic arena, the principle of neutrality posits that the
supranational taxing entity designs its taxes so as minimize the substitution
effect and the consequent deadweight loss. For example, again assuming
that those subject to the tax are countries and not individuals or private
firms, using the country’s GNP as a tax base instead of its national budget
may better conform to the principle of neutrality.65 It is reasonable to
assume that countries would be less likely to refrain from permitting their
64

See supra Part II.A.
GNP, or gross national product, is the market value of all goods and services
produced during a specific time period. See, e.g., JAMES D. GWARTNEY, RICHARD L. STROUP,
RUSSELL S. SOBEL & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, MACROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 107-08 (2014).
65
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GNP to grow in response to a supranational tax than to refrain from
increasing their budget.
A further parallel between domestic taxation and supra-national
taxation is that in both instances, the principle of neutrality is applicable
only to non-Pigouvian taxes. The primary goal of Pigouvian taxation is to
induce market actors to refrain from behavior whose social cost is greater
than the benefit that they expect to derive therefrom.66 Therefore, the fact
that taxpayers change their behavior in response to Pigouvian taxation is a
positive, not a negative, feature of the tax. For example, a well-designed
supra-national tax on greenhouse gas emissions would effectively limit the
emission of greenhouse gasses to those instances in which the benefit of
emitting the gas is greater than the cost imposed on the global community. 67
The fact that market actors would change their behavior and reduce their
emission of greenhouse gasses is not an unfortunate side effect that the
framers of the tax would need to minimize to the extent possible, but rather
the successful realization of its stated objective.68
B. Intranational Taxation
In order to determine the role, if any, of neutrality in intranational
taxation, we first need to discuss the nature of intranational taxation and the
relationship between the host country and those subject to its intranational
tax regime. Only then we will be in a position to consider the principles that
would guide the host country in designing its intranational tax regime and,
specifically, whether neutrality would have a role to play in that regard.
Intranational taxation (i.e., the tax imposed on non-residents who
engage in economic activity in the territory of the host country)69 is in
substance not really a tax. True, it does meet the formal definition of a tax.
As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, a “tax” is “[a] charge, usu.
monetary, imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or
property to yield public revenue.”70
66

See PIGOU, supra note 27, at 192.
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade,
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a
Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environment Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 786
(1999).
68 See McCaffery, supra note 32, at 1048, and the accompanying text.
69 See supra Part III.A for a discussion of limiting the scope of this term for the purpose
of this article.
70 Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See also Tax, OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF ENGLISH (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“A compulsory contribution to state
revenue, levied by the government on workers’ income and business profits, or added to the
cost of some goods, services, and transactions.”); Tax, MERRIAM WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tax (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (“[A] charge
usually of money imposed by authority on persons or property for public purposes.”).
67
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Indeed, the tax imposed by a host country on foreign residents is (a) a
charge, (b) imposed by a government, (c) on persons, entities, transactions,
or property, (d) to yield public revenue. Moreover, intranational taxation
displays all of the outer trappings of a tax. It is imposed under the authority
of the government’s taxing power. The constitutional requirements for
imposing intranational tax are likely the same as they are for imposing
purely domestic tax, and the two are usually included within the same
statute.71 Administration of the intranational tax regime is likely entrusted
to the same agency that administers domestic taxation. The judicial
remedies available to the taxpayer in the event of a disagreement with
administrative authorities with regard to intranational taxes are likely the
same as in the case of domestic taxes.
However, for our purposes the significant question is not whether
intranational taxation satisfies the legal definition of a tax but rather
whether it functions economically as a tax. Consider, for instance, the
economic definition of a tax, which is “a compulsory levy made by public
authorities for which nothing is received directly in return.”72
In other words, for a charge to constitute a tax in the substantive sense
of the term, the payer must receive no direct quid pro quo. If the payer does
receive a direct quid pro quo, then the payment is in fact not a tax but rather
a fee.73 A corollary to the no direct quid pro quo condition is that taxes are
of necessity compulsory payments. The reasoning here is simple: if the
payment is not compulsory, then rational persons will agree to pay only
they receive value at least as great as what they are paying in return. Note,
however, that describing a payment as non-compulsory does not mean that
those subject to the “tax” can choose to pay or not pay as they fit, any more
that those who contract to purchase goods or services can choose to pay or
not pay as they see fit. It simply means that the “taxpayer” had the choice
not to become subject to the tax in the first place. Taxpayers who agree to
subject themselves to the tax indicate by their behavior that the benefit that
they receive in exchange is worth at least as much to them as what they are
obliged to pay.
As an example, consider the case of Pigouvian taxation (either
domestic or supranational). In exchange for the payment, the “taxpayer” is
71

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871-91 (Westlaw 2017).
SIMON JAMES & CHRISTOPHER NOBES, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 10 (12th ed.
2012). See also HYMAN, supra note 20, at 23; ROBERT W. MCGEE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 56 (2004); ROBERT E. PODOLSKY, TITANIA: THE PRACTICAL
ALTERNATIVE TO GOVERNMENT 129-130 (2002).
73 See, e.g., Richard M. Bird & Thomas Tsiopoulos, User Charges for Public Services:
Potentials and Problems, 45 CAN. TAX J. 35, 38 (1997); David G. Duff, Benefit Taxes and
User Fees in Theory and Practice, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 391, 393 (2004); Hugh D. Spitzer,
Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 341 (2002) (“[O]ne must
distinguish between taxes from a legal standpoint . . . and how taxes function from an
economic standpoint”).
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permitted to impose costs on third parties. In fact, we have seen that the
primary purpose of such a tax is to force market actors to consider those
costs and to undertake the cost-imposing behavior only when the quid pro
quo is worth more than the tax.74 This quid pro quo means that in substance
Pigouvian taxes are not taxes but fees, and it is because of their fee-like
nature that the traditional principles of tax theory do not apply to Pigouvian
taxation. In particular, as we have seen, neutrality is not a value in
adjudicating the merits of Pigouvian taxation. 75
Foreign residents who choose to invest in a country or otherwise take
part in its economic life subject themselves to the taxing power of the
government of the host country. In exchange, they receive access to the host
country’s territory, resources, and markets. In other words, the “tax” that a
host country imposes upon foreign residents is more accurately described as
a fee than as a tax. From the perspective of those non-residents, the tax
imposed upon them by the host country is simply a cost of doing business
in that country. If they believe the charge to be higher than the value
received, they have the option of not paying the host country’s tax and
doing business elsewhere instead.76
A further distinction between purely domestic taxation and
supranational taxation on the one hand and intranational taxation on the
other concerns the relationship between the tax-imposing entity and those
who are subject to its taxing power. With regard to both domestic and
supranational taxation, the tax-imposing entity owes a fiduciary duty to the
taxpaying public. Every act that it undertakes, including the imposition of
taxation, must be justified by reference to its impact on the welfare of the
public whom it serves. To take one example, taxes imposed for the purpose
of supplying goods are justified if, and only if, the aggregate benefit to be
derived from the good is greater than the aggregate cost of supplying the
good. Moreover, in the case of purely domestic or supranational taxation,
the tax paying entity has no legitimate independent need or desire for tax
revenue. Consequently, there is no principle asserting that, all else being
equal, more taxes are better than less taxes. If the public use of funds better
promotes the welfare of the taxpaying public as a whole, then the tax is
justified;77 otherwise it is not.78
74

See PIGOU, supra note 27, at 192.
See supra Parts II.B and III.B.
76 See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R.
Tillinghast Lecture - What’s Source Got to Do With it - Source Rules and U.S. International
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 91-93 (2002).
77 Of course, determining the welfare of the taxpaying public as a whole can be far from
uncontroversial, particularly when we consider the distributive effect of taxation. A tax
scheme favored by some elements of the population may be opposed by others. However,
given whatever social utility function is adopted by means of the legitimate operation of the
political process, taxes are justified if, and only if, they – along with the services and transfer
payments that they fund – promote overall societal welfare. Note that in the case of domestic
taxation the relevant population are members of the domestic society, while in the case of
75
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With regard to its intranational tax regime, the position of a
government is entirely dissimilar. Vis-à-vis foreign investors, the
government of the host country has a clear, independent, and justified
desire to increase tax revenue to the extent possible. Every dollar that it
collects from international investors is one less dollar that it has to collect
from its own constituents, one more dollar that it can spend on promoting
their welfare without them having to pay for it, one less dollar that it needs
to borrow, and so forth. All else being equal, the more it can successfully
collect from international investors, the better.79
Furthermore, as opposed to its position vis-à-vis domestic taxpayers,
the host country has no fiduciary duty to foreigners. The duties that it owes
foreigners are limited to those of fair play: negotiating in good faith,
keeping its promises, and so forth. With regard to its own residents, the
only legitimate justification for imposing tax is that doing so promotes the
welfare of the taxpaying public. If it does not do so, then the tax is an
illegitimate use of sovereign power. With regard to foreigners, the only
justification the government needs to offer as to why it is imposing tax is
that it can. All the government needs to say – all that it implicitly does say –
is that it would prefer that its own constituents end up with more and that
the foreigner ends up with less.80
supranational taxation the relevant population is humanity as a whole.
78 True, the ideal described in the text is rarely actualized, even in modern democratic
states. Politicians and bureaucrats have interests that are not always fully aligned with those
of the overall population. The phenomenon of governments raising funds to support or
expand programs and bureaucracies even when there is no rational justification for their size
or even for their existence, a phenomenon often referred to as “Leviathan,” has been much
noted in the literature. Charles B. Blankart & David C. Ehmke, Fiscal Constitutions,
Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN: A
THEORIST OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 147, 148 (Richard E. Wagner
ed., 2018); GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 1-33 (1980). Similarly, the fact that governments
are often especially attuned to the needs of special interest groups to the determent of the
general population is also well known. STEPHEN J. BAILEY, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 101 (1995). However, the agency problem faced by modern
democracies – the misalignment of the interests of politicians and bureaucrats, on the one
hand, and the public that they ostensibly serve on the other – does not undermine
contemporary tax theory, any more than does the fact the well-meaning policy-makers often
err in evaluating the consequences of their actions. The task of tax theory is to describe how
taxes should operate, not how they do operate. In fact, it is only within an ideal paradigm of
government operating solely for the benefit of the governed that we can critique these
phenomena.
79 See, e.g., League of Nation’s Report on Double Taxation, supra note 49, at 4044 (“A
survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how completely the Governments are
dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner.”). This observation is as relevant today, in the
age of tax competition, as it was a century ago. As explained in the text, what has ebbed is
not the desire of governments to tax the foreigner, but rather their capacity to do so.
80 In 1775, Samuel Johnson defined a tax as “a payment exacted by authority from part
of the community for the benefit of the whole.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, TAXATION NO TYRANNY:
AN ANSWER TO THE RESOLUTIONS AND ADDRESS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 13 (1775). Note
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However, the fact that the relationship between the host country and
international investors is more akin to a contractual relationship in which
each party attempts to promote its own interest than it is to a fiduciary
relationship is a double-edged sword. While residents have little choice but
to be subject to their country’s tax system – they can try to reduce their tax
liability within the system by modifying their behavior, but they are subject
nevertheless to the system as a whole – foreign investors have a choice.81
As with any contractual negotiation, they can accept the terms offered by
the other side, negotiate for better terms, or reject the offer and do business
elsewhere. Thus, while in the domestic arena the government has fairly free
rein to determine what it considers to be the appropriate tax structure and to
use the sovereign power at its disposal to enforce its will, in the
international arena its tax-imposing capacity is subject to a simple ‘no’
from potential taxpayers.82 Despite its desire to collect as much revenue
from foreigners as possible, it needs to moderate its demands.
Such being the case, what are the principles that will guide a rational
country in designing its intranational tax regime?
From the perspective of the host country, international investment
entails both non-tax benefits and costs. The minimum tax that a rational
country would be willing to accept from a foreign investor is an amount
equal to the expected cost minus the expected benefits (net cost). Anything
less than that and the investment will constitute a net drain on the host
country’s resources and no rational country would agree to such a
proposition. Note that the terms, “net cost” and “tax” may take either
positive or negative values. Consequently, if the benefits of hosting an
investment outweigh the costs (producing a net benefit or a negative net
cost), the minimum tax the country would be willing to impose is a negative
the limiting phrase, “from part of the community.” Id. As foreigners are not part of the
community, it is arguable that Johnson would not include the taxation of foreigners within
the ambit of a tax.
81 True, in one sense residents also have a choice. If they believe the tax burden imposed
by their government is onerous, they have the option of emigrating (and, in the case of the
United States, renouncing their citizenship) and thereby escaping the grip of the country’s
tax laws. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX
REV. 299, 309 n.18 (2001) (“[A]n expatriate’s decision not to renounce U.S. citizenship can
be seen as evidence that the benefits of citizenship are worth facing an annual U.S. tax on
worldwide income.”). For an interesting contrast, see Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the
Taxation of International Income, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 146 (1998) (“Regarding
individual taxpayers, President Clinton and members of Congress have taken steps to
prevent wealthy U.S. taxpayers from escaping federal income tax by the simple expedient of
giving up their U.S. citizenship.”). However, in practice individuals are much less mobile
than is capital. Only in rare circumstances will individuals emigrate from the country in
which they reside (and, in the case of the United States, renounce their citizenship) because
of changes in the tax laws. Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And Yet It Moves: Taxation and Labor
Mobility in the Twenty-First Century, 67 TAX L. REV. 169 (2014).
82 See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 9, at 12-15.
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tax (i.e., a grant or a subsidy), the absolute amount of which is equal to the
net benefit that it expects to procure. For example, assume that the net
benefit of hosting an investment is $100. The net cost is -$100, and the
minimum tax that the host country would be willing to accept is the same.
In other words, it would be willing to offer grants and subsidies of up to
$100 in order to attract the investment.
However, imposing a tax equal to net cost (whether positive or
negative) is far from ideal from the perspective of the host country. As
already noted, the more that the host country can successfully collect from
foreign residents the better. The minimum is covering costs. Beyond that
the sky is the limit.83 The only limitation is the foreign investor’s ability to
say ‘no,’ a scenario that would mean not only a loss of tax revenue but also
a loss of non-tax benefits (if the investment would indeed have produced
net non-tax benefits).
With regards to large investments, tax is often negotiated on a case-bycase basis. A multinational enterprise might approach a number of
countries, ask each what it is willing to offer, negotiate terms, and then
choose the option that offers the highest possible after-tax return.84 In terms
83 At this point, a brief comparison between intranational taxation and Pigouvian tax is
perhaps in order. We have seen that Pigouvian taxation and intranational taxation share the
attribute of being in substance not a tax, but rather a fee, as the taxpayer receives a direct
quid pro quo: the right to impose a cost on other members of society or access to a country’s
territory, resources, and markets, respectively. Furthermore, we have already seen that
neutrality is inapplicable to Pigouvian taxation and will soon see that it is inapplicable to
intranational taxation. Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between them.
Pigouvian taxation is still part of a country’s domestic tax regime, meaning that the
Pigouvian taxpayers are members of the collective to which the government owes a
fiduciary duty and whose interests it is bound to serve. Consequently, a properly constructed
Pigouvian tax will quantify exactly the cost imposed on third parties. In other words, the
social cost of the taxpayer’s behavior is both the minimum and the maximum of the ideal
Pigouvian tax. In contrast, the government owes no fiduciary duty to foreign investors when
selling access. Just covering the social cost of hosting the investment is far from an ideal
situation from the perspective of the host country. From its perspective the more that it can
successfully charge, the better.
84 See, e.g., Nov, supra note 2, at 841-82; Intel in Israel: A Fad Relationship Faces
Criticism, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 29, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article/intel-israel-old-relationship-faces-new-criticism/ (“Israel has to compete with
other countries every few years to be the site of the next new and upgraded plant. In 2012,
Ireland won the race to host Intel’s next generation 14-nanometer chip plant because the
company deemed Israel’s offer of 1 billion shekels in aid as insufficient.”). The phenomenon
exists also with regard to state and local taxation. Bill Bradley, Nike Made $25 Billion Last
Year, Still Got a Tax Break from Oregon, NEXT CITY (Aug. 16, 2013),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nike-had-25-billion-last-year-still-got-a-tax-break-fromoregon (Oregon passed special legislation guaranteeing Nike’s preferential tax treatment in
response to Nike’s threat to leave the state); Jacob Passy, This is what Amazon’s ‘HQ2’ was
going to cost New York taxpayers, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16, 2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-amazons-hq2-means-for-taxpayers-in-new-yorkand-virginia-2018-11-14 (Boeing, Alcoa, Foxconn, Amazon, General Motors, Ford, Sempra
Energy, and Nike received incentive packages of $2 billion to $8.7 billion from cities and
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of negotiating theory, the host country’s best alternative to negotiated
agreement (BATNA) is equal to the net cost (positive or negative) of
hosting the investment.85 The investor’s BATNA is the amount of tax that
produces the same after-tax return as in the most attractive alternative
venue.86 If the host country’s BATNA is higher that the investor’s BATNA
(i.e., the least tax that the host country would agree to accept is less than the
most that the investor would be willing to pay), then there is no zone of
possible agreement (ZOPA),87 a fact that the negotiators will eventually
discover. If there is a ZOPA (i.e., if the host country’s BATNA is lower
than the investor’s BATNA), then the host country will of course attempt to
determine and settle as close to the investor’s BATNA as possible.88
However, case-by-case negotiation is often impractical. For example,
assume that a lender is negotiating the terms of a loan to a resident of
another country. It is not ordinarily practical for the lender to enter into
simultaneous negotiations with the treasury of the borrower’s home country
regarding the tax implications of the loan. For this reason, countries enact
statutory intranational tax regimes, effectively offering access to all comers
and setting forth a price for such access.89 In such instances, the dilemma
facing the host country is analogous to that facing any other seller of goods
or services who sets a fixed price. The higher the price, the more it will earn
from each sale but the fewer sales it will make; the lower the price, the
more it will sell but the less it will earn from each sale. Finding the
appropriate balance is a matter of being aware of what other countries are
offering and having a proper evaluation of one’s own bargaining position;
to wit, the relative advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of
international investors of investing in one’s country.
The principle of neutrality has no role to play in the design of an
states).
85 See generally, DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS:
HOW TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES AND ACHIEVE BRILLIANT RESULTS AT THE BARGAINING
TABLE AND BEYOND 20–23 (2007).
86 For instance, assume that investment in Country A offers a pretax return of 16%, that
investment in Country B offers a pretax return of 15%, and that the minimum tax that
County B is willing to accept is equal to 20% of the pretax return. Because the after-tax
return in Country B is 12% (pretax return of 15% minus a 20% tax), the MNE’s BATNA is
negotiating with Country A is a tax equal to 25% of its pretax return: with a 16% pretax
return and a tax rate of 25%, the after-tax return from investing in Country A will be 12%,
equal to the after-tax return in the best alternative venue.
87 See generally MALHOTRA & BAZERMAN, supra note 85, at 23.
88 See generally Id. at 23-24.
89 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 865(a)(1) (Westlaw 2017) (effectively exempting from tax the
gain on sale of personal property by non-resident aliens and foreign corporations); 871(a)
(30% tax on gross FDAP income of non-resident aliens), (b) (graduated tax on taxable
business income of non-resident aliens), (h) (exemption from tax on portfolio interest of
non-resident aliens); 881(a) (30% tax on gross FDAP income of foreign corporations), (c)
(exemption from tax on portfolio interest of foreign corporations); 882(a) (standard
corporate-rate tax on business income of foreign corporations).
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intranational tax regime, whether such a regime is negotiated on a case-bycase basis or is imposed by statute. Neutrality posits that taxes should
disturb investment patterns as little as possible so that capital flows to the
same investments that it would have in the absence of taxation.90 In the
intranational sphere, neutrality would require the host country to view the
international investments that it would have received in the absence of
taxation as a model and to design its intranational tax regime so as to
disturb this ideal investment pattern as little as possible. There is no rational
reason for a host country to adopt such a policy. If the taxes that a country
imposes discourage investments that would have constituted a net drain on
the country’s resources, then it is a positive phenomenon. If by means of its
tax system a country is successfully able to woo investments that carry the
potential of providing net after-tax benefits to residents of the host country
(and that would otherwise have gone elsewhere), this too is a positive
phenomenon. From the perspective of the host country, the fact that in each
case, the host country’s intranational tax regime disturbs the investment
pattern that would have occurred in a no-tax world is irrelevant.
In more general terms, countries will strive to sell access to their
territories, their resources, and their markets at the highest price that the
market will bear, provided that the tax they receive is greater than the net
cost of hosting the investment.91 The ideal intranational tax regime is one in
which the sum of non-tax benefits and tax revenue from hosting
international investment is maximized.
A host country has no need or incentive to adopt a neutral intranational
tax regime (i.e., one that attempts to replicate the investment patterns that
would have prevailed in a no-tax world). It is not merely that other
considerations are often more pressing and that neutrality must occasionally
be sacrificed for the sake of achieving alternative goals.92 It is that
neutrality is quite simply not a consideration at all.
C. Inter-jurisdictional Taxation
It is with regard to inter-jurisdictional taxation–the attempt to
coordinate various countries’ intranational tax regimes–that the tendency to
blur the lines separating the different types of international taxation is
perhaps the most prevalent and the consequences of doing so the most
egregious. A prevalent theme in the international tax literature is that while
neutrality may not be a relevant consideration from the perspective of
90

See supra Part II.A.
Recall that the terms “tax” and “net cost” can take negative values, so that when net
cost is negative, the minimum tax will also be negative (i.e., when there is a net benefit, the
host country will be willing to offer grants and subsidies).
92 In the domestic (and supranational) non-Pigouvian arena, neutrality, although an
important goal, must often be balanced against competing goals. See text accompanying note
26, supra.
91
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individual host countries, it is a relevant consideration from a global
perspective.93 For example, assume that Country A offers a higher pretax
return, while Country B offers a higher after-tax return. Because what
motivates investors is after-tax return, capital will flow to Country B even
though–so it is claimed–the capital would be more efficiency deployed in
Country A. Thus, one important policy objective of contemporary interjurisdictional taxation is to neutralize the effect of taxes in investment
decisions and to replicate, to the extent possible, the investment pattern that
would have prevailed in a no-tax world.94
True, most commentators agree that neutralizing the effect of taxation
on international investments is not an achievable aim.95 The most
straightforward way of removing tax as a factor in investment decisions
would be to equalize by international convention the tax burden imposed by
all countries on economic activity in their territories. However, any attempt
to do so would face insurmountable theoretical and practical obstacles.
First, it is generally recognized that countries have the sovereign right to
determine the size of their public sector. Those that desire a relatively large
public sector will generally impose a higher burden on the taxpaying public
than those that prefer a relatively small private sector.96 Forcing all
countries to equalize the tax burdens that they impose on economic activity
in their territories in an attempt to neutralize the effect of taxation in
international investment decisions would effectively deny them the right to
determine the size of their government.97 Second, even if there were a
93 See, e.g., GRAVELLE, supra note 1, at 4 (“A country can . . . choose a policy that leads
to the greatest welfare for its own citizens, even if that policy distorts the allocation of
capital (is not neutral) and leads to less efficient worldwide production. The optimal policy
from the perspective of a country, in other words, may not be the most efficient in terms of
the worldwide allocation of capital, and may not be the optimal policy from the perspective
of world economic welfare.”).
94 See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., The Case against Deferral: A Deferential
Reconsideration, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 385, 395-96 (1999); Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral and
the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 589, 590 (2000);
Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 492.
95 See, e.g., Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 684 (“Elimination of competition and tax
sensitivity could be achieved if all countries adhered to principles of capital export
neutrality. However, this would require international coordination and cooperation to a
degree that appears overwhelmingly unattainable.”); Victor Thuronyi, International Tax
Cooperation and a Multinational Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1642 n.8 (2001). Tax
is not the only forum within which counties compete. See generally, e.g., Mitchell Kane &
Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1229 (2008).
96
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution
and Tax Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371, 375, 384 (2004). For a discussion of the role
of sovereignty in the development of tax law, see Allison Christians, Steven Dean, Diane
Ring, & Adam Rosenzweig, Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon, 14 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 309-11 (2008).
97 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Crisis, supra note 2, at 1629.

36

Neutrality in International Taxation
40:1 (2019)

binding international standard that required countries to impose the same
tax rates such a standard would be ineffective without also standardizing
the tax base.98 Assuming that the relevant measure is an income tax, this
would mean that all countries would need to adopt identical provisions for
determining taxable income (e.g., what is included in gross income? Which
deductions are permissible? What is the appropriate rate of depreciation for
every type of asset? Under what circumstances can losses be deducted?) To
put it in the starkest terms possible, harmonization would require either that
the rest of the world adopt Title 26 of the United States Code (not a likely
prospect) or that the United States scrap its own Internal Revenue Code and
adopt in its place whatever code is agreed upon by international convention
(also not a likely prospect). Moreover, even if a standard internal revenue
code were adopted by every country on the planet, the task would still not
be complete. If administrative or judicial interpretation of the code varied
from country to country, the effective tax burden would not be the same. 99
Enforcement of the common norms would also need to be standardized.100
Because of the difficulties inherent in attempting to equalize
international taxation and thereby remove tax as a factor in making
international investment decisions, scholars and policy-makers tend to
moderate their goals and instead focus on measures such as countering tax
regimes that operate as “tax havens” or that are engaged in “harmful tax
competition.”101 Nevertheless, these are usually viewed as compromise
measures. Harmonization of tax regimes is ordinarily considered the
(admittedly unattainable) Holy Grail of inter-jurisdictional taxation.102
My argument is that such a goal is misguided. Even if it were possible
to adopt measures that would neutralize the effect of taxation on
international investment so that investment patterns mimicked those that
would have prevailed in a no-tax world, such measures would actually
98 Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61, S78 (2002)
(“[T]ax rate harmonization has been accorded higher priority, despite widespread knowledge
of the toothlessness of such proposals in the absence of tax base harmonization.”).
99 Jeffrey Owens, The David H. Tillinghast Lecture Tax Competition: To Welcome or
Not?, 65 TAX L. REV. 173, 183-84 (2012).
100 See, e.g., Dean, supra note 7, at 139–40.
101 See, e.g., Conclusions of the Ecofin Council Meeting on 1 December 1997
Concerning Taxation Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2/01) 1, 4 (EC); Dean, supra note 7, at 132-33;
Kudrle & Eden, supra note 51, at 37–42, 46-47; Hedda Leikvang, Piercing the Veil of
Secrecy: Securing Effective Exchange of Information to Remedy the Harmful Effects of Tax
Havens, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293, 299 (2012); Harmful Tax Competition, supra note
33; Rosenzweig, supra note 2, 936–42.
102 An alternative to harmonizing tax regimes is for home countries to impose an
effective worldwide tax on their domestic corporations and on foreign corporations
controlled by their domestic corporations and to permit a full credit for foreign taxes paid or
incurred. Assuming that the domestic tax rate is no lower than the tax rate applicable in the
countries in with the corporation operated, the effective tax burden will not be dependent
upon the location of the corporation’s investments. See, e.g., OECD, Action 3, supra note 6.
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misallocate capital and reduce aggregate global welfare. In the interjurisdictional arena, it is not the pretax rate of return but rather the after-tax
rate of return that is relevant for determining efficiency. In other words, in
order to maximize aggregate global welfare, capital must flow to where the
after-tax return is the highest.
As we saw in our discussion of taxation in the purely domestic sphere,
the principle of neutrality is a response to the substitution effect of nonPigouvian taxes. The principle posits that, all else being equal, the less the
behavioral change precipitated by such taxes, the less the deadweight loss
and the more efficient the tax. Therefore, if the pretax return from
Investment A is higher than the pretax return from Investment B but the
after-tax return from Investment B is higher than the after-tax return from
investment A, then the anticipated flow of resources to Investment B likely
constitutes an inefficient allocation of resources. Undertaking measures to
encourage the flow of capital to Investment A and thereby recreating the
investment pattern that would have occurred in a no-tax world could
contribute to allocative efficiency.103
On the other hand, we have seen that even within the domestic sphere,
the principle of neutrality does not apply to Pigouvian taxation. When
taxpayers modify their behavior in order to avoid a properly constructed
Pigouvian tax, the substitution effect does not produce a deadweight loss,
but actually promotes economic efficiency. In other words, with regard to
Pigouvian taxation it is the after-tax return and not the pretax return that
determines allocative efficiency. If the pretax return from Investment A is
higher than that from Investment B but (after the introduction of a property
designed Pigouvian tax) the after-tax return from Investment B is higher
than that from Investment A, then the anticipated flow of resources to
Investment B will promote aggregate social welfare.104
Analytically, why is the principle of neutrality applicable to nonPigouvian taxation but not to Pigouvian taxation? In other words, why does
the relative pretax return reflect allocative efficiency in the former case,
while in the latter it is the relative after-tax return that reflects efficiency? I
would posit that the applicability of the principle of neutrality to a given
type of tax depends upon the relationship between the tax in question and
the market. Non-Pigouvian taxes do not reflect either consumer preferences
or the availability of resources. Whereas taxpayers’ pretax behavior is their
considered response to supply and demand as expressed in the price
structure (how much the market values what they have to offer and how
much it values the resources that they desire), their after-tax behavior is
skewed by the non-market effect of the tax. Consequently, the tax might
dissuade taxpayers (whether acting in their capacity as suppliers of goods
and services or in their capacity as consumers) from engaging in a course of
103
104

38

See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
See supra Part II.B.

Neutrality in International Taxation
40:1 (2019)

action that would otherwise entail an efficient use of resources. This change
of behavior — the substitution effect — is what produces the deadweight
loss.105
With regard to Pigouvian taxation, the situation is reversed. Because
the market operating on its own does not account for externalities, pretax
prices do not fully reflect consumer preferences or the availability of
resources and, consequently, may encourage behavior that is sub-optimal
from a societal perspective. By modifying prices to reflect the true cost of
taxpayers’ behavior, a properly constructed Pigouvian tax forces taxpayers
to respond to the actual supply of and the demand for resources. Thus, I
would argue, the question of whether pretax return or post-tax return is the
appropriate benchmark for determining efficiency is a function of whether
the tax itself reflects supply and demand. If it does not, then pretax behavior
is optimal. If it does, then after-tax behavior is optimal from a societal
perspective.
Intranational taxation is the price charged by host countries for access
to their territory and their markets.106 The amount that they can successfully
charge is a function of what they have to offer relative to alternative venues
and what foreign investors need. The more the demand for what they have
to offer and the less the supply, the higher the price that they can charge.
Furthermore, the more the host country desires the investment the less tax it
will demand (indeed it may adopt a negative tax - a subsidy or a grant - to
attract the investment), while the less desirous it is of the investment the
more it will demand as the price of access. The interplay between the needs,
the desires, and the resources that each party brings to the table will
determine the tax that the host country will be able to collect from foreign
investors. Because intranational taxation reflects supply and demand, the
pretax return represents an incomplete picture of global resources and
preferences. Consequently, an investment pattern that responds to pretax
return will not necessarily best promote global welfare. Efficiency requires
that investment be allowed to flow to the place offering the highest after-tax
return.
As an example, assume that a corporation is considering establishing a
manufacturing plant in one of two countries. Country P is a wealthy country
with a developed economy. The pretax return from investing in Country P
is 12%. However, the proposed manufacturing plant and its attendant
activities will burden Country P’s infrastructure and lower the quality of
life of its residents. Consequently, Country P is unwilling to allow the
corporation to operate in its territory unless it pays a tax equal to 50% of its
projected pretax profits. In contrast, Country Q is a relatively poor country
with an underdeveloped economy and a primitive infrastructure. The
105

See supra notes 15-17 and the accompanying text.
As already noted, from an economic perspective intranational taxes are not taxes but
fees. See supra Part III.B.
106

39

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:1 (2019)

proposed manufacturing plant would provide much-needed jobs that would
stimulate the local economy, relieve social unrest, and release the
government from some of its obligation to provide a social safety net. It
would provide job-training and managerial experience for local residents
and exposure to world markets. Furthermore, in order to be able to ship raw
materials into and finished products out of the plant, the corporation will
need to invest funds in developing the physical infrastructure in the plant’s
vicinity. Given these advantages, Country Q is willing to allow the
corporation to operate in its territory without paying any tax whatsoever.107
Of course, Country Q would prefer collecting tax revenue from the
corporation, but it is aware that should it set its price too high the
corporation may go elsewhere and Country Q will lose the opportunity to
host what for it is a very beneficial investment. Assume that the
corporation’s investing in Country Q will produce a return of 8%.108
In a tax-free world, the corporation would prefer investing in Country
P (pretax return of 12% versus a pretax return of 8% in Country Q).
However, given the tax differential, the corporation will likely invest in
Country Q (after-tax return of 8% versus an after-tax return of 6% in
Country P). Much of the international tax literature castigates this violation
of neutrality and argues that, from a global perspective, resources are being
used in an inefficient manner.109 The idea behind this argument is that in a
competitive market, a higher pretax return is indicative of a more efficient
use of resources. By directing resources away from that country in which
the market return is the highest, the international tax structure produces
inefficiency and reduces aggregate global welfare.
The problem with this argument is its failure to recognize that
intranational taxation is part and parcel of the market pricing mechanism.
The amount that a country can charge international actors for access to its
territory reflects the supply of and the demand for international investments
and international investment venues. Therefore, with regard to intranational
taxation it is the relative after-tax return, not the relative pretax return that
determines market efficiency. In our example above, if we consider the
benefits that the residents of Country Q would expect to reap and the cost
that the residents of Country P would expect to bear from hosting the
investment, we can see that establishing the plant in Country Q will better
promote aggregate global welfare. Our source of information for this
conclusion is the fact that, after both countries have signaled to the market via their intranational tax regimes - the cost or benefit from the perspective
of their own residents of hosting the investment, the after-tax return from
107 Country Q might be willing to provide grants or subsidies (i.e., to impose a negative
tax) in order to attract the investment. In such a case the after-tax return would be higher
than the pretax return.
108 As Corporation C is not subject to tax, its pretax and after-tax return will be the same.
109 See, e.g., supra notes 1, 2, 7, and 34.
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investing in Country Q is greater than the after-tax return from investing in
Country P.110 Any inter-jurisdictional attempt to restore, in the name of
neutrality, the investment pattern that would have prevailed in the absence
of taxation would not only fail to promote aggregate global welfare but
would actually be counterproductive in this regard.
As was the case with regard to intranational taxation,111 it is not that
neutrality is a principle that ideally would be respected in interjurisdictional taxation but must be abandoned when it conflicts with other
principles.112 There is not even a prima facie reason to presume that an
inter-jurisdictional tax regime that respects neutrality is preferable to one
that does not. Neutrality is simply not a proper goal of inter-jurisdictional
taxation.
In more universal terms, let us define the terms Yx and Cx as follows:
(1) YX = the expected pretax income from investing in Country X,
110 The text intentionally ignores international externalities and implicitly assumes either
that the investment will not significantly affect the welfare of those living outside the host
country or that it will produce the same effect regardless of its location. Of course, it is
possible that, in our example, investment in Country Q will produce a greater negative
international externality than will investing in Country P, or that investing in Country P will
produce a greater positive international externality than will investing in Country Q, and, as
a consequence, investing in Country P will better promote global welfare than will
investment in Country Q. However, this is a fact-specific circumstance and in no way
undermines the thesis of this sub-Part, namely that neutrality is inapplicable in interjurisdictional taxation. True, if it could be shown that investments in countries offering a
higher pretax return produce fewer negative international externalities or more positive
international externalities than do investments in countries offering a higher after-tax return,
this would lend a modicum of support to the argument that pretax return is a relevant
consideration in promoting global welfare. However, to the best of my knowledge, no one
has suggested that such is the case. Indeed, it appears highly unlikely that there is any
meaningful correlation between relative pretax return and the extent of international
externalities. Thus, while it is possible that, in a specific instance, investing in a country
offering a higher pretax return but a lower after-tax return might constitute a more efficient
use of global resources, it is much more likely that, over the long run, a large series of
investments in countries offering the highest after-tax return will promote aggregate global
welfare better than a large series of investments in countries offering the highest pretax rate
of return. In any case, if the international community is interested in overcoming
international externalities, the proper means of doing so would be supranational regulation
or, even better, a supranational Pigouvian tax. It is important to note that the term,
“international externalities,” like its domestic counterpart, does not include all effects on
third parties, but only those effects that the market mechanism does not take into account.
Thus, the fact that investing in one country may deprive another country of the opportunity
to host the investment is not an externality, but is rather an effect that is fully taken into
consideration by the market. As we have seen, if the package of taxes and incentives that a
country can offer is insufficient to attract the investment (i.e., if the highest after-tax return
that a country can offer is less than the after-tax return available elsewhere), then investing
in that country will most likely not increase aggregate global welfare as much as investing in
the country that was actually chosen to host the investment.
111 See supra Part III.B.
112 Cf. text accompanying note 26 supra.
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while
(2) CX = the expected pretax net cost to Country X of hosting the
investment.
The pretax net cost of hosting an investment is the totality of the
pretax costs that the host country expects to incur minus the totality of the
pretax benefits that it expects to obtain from hosting the investment. If
benefits exceed cost (i.e., if there is a positive pretax net benefit), then Cx
will be negative.
The over-all contribution of the investment to aggregate global welfare
is equal to the pretax income that the investor expects to derive from the
investment - a figure that represents consumer demand for the goods that it
produces, the availability of labor and capital, and so forth - minus the costs
that the host country will incur in hosting the investment. Thus,
(3) (YX – CX) = the contribution to aggregate global welfare of selecting
Country X as an investment venue.113
As we have noted, the minimum tax that a rational country will agree
to accept in order to host an international investment is equal to the net cost
of hosting the investment (if the net cost is negative then the minimum tax
will also be negative, i.e., the maximum that it would agree to pay would
equal the net benefits that it expects to obtain from hosting the investment).
Thus,
(4) CX = the minimum tax that Country X will demand to host the
investment.
Seeing as YX is the expected pretax income from investing in Country
X, while Cx is the minimum tax that Country X will demand:
(5) (YX – CX) = the maximum possible after-tax income from investing
in Country X.
Applying statement (3), we know that for any two countries P and Q:
(6) If (YQ – CQ) > (YP – CP), then the contribution to aggregate global
113 Alternatively, we can define B as the expected pretax net benefit (benefits minus
X
costs) of hosting the investment. As Bx = -Cx, the contribution to aggregate global welfare can
be described as. Mathematically, the two expressions (YX – CX and YX + Bx) are identical. For
the sake of consistency, the text will simply use the term CX, which can take either positive
or negative values.
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welfare of investing in Country Q is greater that the contribution to
aggregate global welfare of investing in Country P.
Furthermore, applying statement (5), we know that for any two
countries P and Q:
(7) If (YQ – CQ) > (YP – CP), then the maximum possible after-tax
income from investing in Country Q is greater than the maximum
possible after-tax income from investing in Country P.
Comparing statements (6) and (7), we can see that the country able
to offer the higher after-tax return is the investment venue that would better
promote aggregate global welfare. In contrast, the fact that YP > YQ offers
no indication that (YP – CP) > (YQ – CQ). In other words, the fact that one
country is able to offer a higher pretax return offers no indication that
investing in that country will constitute a more efficient allocation of
resources.114

114 The text does not consider the distribution of the efficiency bonus that arises from the
choice of Country Q as an investment venue. The thesis of this subpart is that an efficient
allocation of global resources requires capital to flow to those venues offering the highest
after-tax rate of return, not to those offering the highest pretax rate of return. The question of
who will benefit from the efficiency bonus is beyond the parameters of our current
discussion. However, in very encapsulated terms, let us assume that
(8) (YQ – CQ) > (YP – CP) > (YR – CR), where R represents any venue other than Country P
and Country Q.
In other words, Country Q has to potential to offer the highest after-tax return and Country P
has the potential to offer the second highest rate of return. In such a case, the most that the
investor will be willing to pay to Country Q is the amount that would make the after-tax
return in Country Q equal to the after-tax return from investing in Country P. Algebraically,
the most that the investor would be willing to pay Country P is
(9) YQ – (YP – CP).
To see why this is so, recall that the pretax income in Country Q is YQ. If the tax imposed by
Country Q is YQ – (YP – CP), then the after-tax return would be YQ – [YQ – (YP – CP)]. This
equals YP – CP, which is the after-tax return in Country P, the next best alternative. In other
words, the investor’s indifferent point is when Country Q tax is YQ – (YP – CP). Any higher
and the investor will prefer Country P; any less and the investor will prefer Country Q.
Consequently, Country Q’s BATNA is CQ, while the investor’s BATNA is YQ – (YP – CP).
See supra note 86 and the accompanying text. From (8), we know that CQ < YQ – (YP – CP),
meaning that the minimum tax Country Q will take is less than the maximum tax that the
investor will pay. The area between those points represents the ZOPA. See supra note 85 at
23 and the accompanying text. Unless one or both parties incorrectly estimate the other
side’s BATNA or engage in an ultimately self-destructive game of chicken, a deal will be
struck somewhere within that zone. The exact point within the ZOPA where the deal will be
struck depends upon all of the facts and circumstances, including the negotiating skills of
those representing the two sides, the political and economic pressures that both parties they
face, and so forth.
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CONCLUSION
The discourse with regard to international taxation is fraught with
conceptual confusion. First, there is a tendency among scholars and policymakers in the field of international taxation to rely upon concepts that were
developed within the context of domestic taxation, without a thorough
examination of their applicability to the international arena. Second, there is
a tendency to lump together a number of very distinct types of tax regimes
under the category of international taxation, which fails to recognize that
the principles of tax theory relevant to each are also different.
One theorem underlying domestic tax theory is that allocative
efficiency can be achieved only when capital flows to those investments
offering the highest pretax return. When investments with a relatively low
pretax return are able to offer a relatively high after-tax return, capital will
be misdirected and resources will not be used in the most efficient manner.
The principle of neutrality posits, therefore, that taxes should not change
investment patterns and that those investment opportunities that would have
attracted capital in the absence of taxation should continue to attract capital
following the imposition of tax.
However, even within the domestic sphere, the principle of neutrality
is not universally valid. With regard to Pigouvian taxes, it is not the pretax
but rather the after-tax return that determines efficiency. If, following the
imposition of a properly designed Pigouvian tax, investments that offer a
relatively high pretax return now offer a relatively low after-tax return, the
expected change in investment decisions will increase aggregate societal
welfare. The fact that such investments offer a relatively high pretax return
but a relatively low after-tax return merely indicates that the activity
concerned imposes a cost on third parties, a cost for which the market
operating on its own does not account.
Moving to the international arena, the principles that would apply to a
hypothetical supranational tax are similar to those of domestic tax theory.
Here, too, non-Pigouvian taxes should be designed to be as neutral as
possible, while the principle of neutrality would inapplicable for Pigouvian
taxes (such as a tax on carbon emissions). As in the domestic sphere,
allocative efficiency is determined by pretax return in the case of nonPigouvian taxes and by after-tax return in the case of Pigouvian taxation.
However, most of the discourse in the field of international law
concerns not supranational taxation, but rather intranational and interjurisdictional taxation. Nevertheless, perhaps because it describes all three
under the catchall phrase of international taxation, it fails to recognize that
while the principles of domestic taxation would be applicable to a
hypothetical supranational tax regime, they are inappropriate in the context
of intranational and inter-jurisdictional taxation.
When designing its intranational tax regime, there is no reason for a
host country to consider as its point of reference the international
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investments that it would have hosted in the absence of taxation and to
attempt to duplicate that pattern in the after-tax world. Rather it will attempt
to use its tax laws, among other measures, to attract investments that are
likely to promote the interests of its constituents and to deter investments
that are likely to be detrimental to those interests. Whether such
investments would have occurred in a world without tax is not a relevant
consideration. The principle that will guide countries in designing their
intranational tax regime is the desire to maximize the total benefit (i.e., the
non-tax benefit plus the tax revenue) from hosting international
investments.
With regard to inter-jurisdictional taxation, the key point is that
because intranational tax is in substance a fee that host countries charge for
access to their territory, it is part and parcel of the market mechanism and
reflects the supply of and the demand for international investments and
international investment venues. Therefore, an efficient allocation of global
resources requires that capital be directed to those investments that offer the
highest after-tax return. An inter-jurisdictional tax regime that successfully
neutralized the effect of intranational taxation in international investment
decisions — a cherished goal of the international tax literature — would in
fact create allocative efficiency and reduce aggregate global welfare.
If the international tax dialogue were focused on the design of a (nonPigouvian) supranational tax regime, then neutrality would properly play a
central role in the discourse. However, discussions of cross-country
cooperation to establish a modern “international tax regime” are almost
always concerned with inter-jurisdictional taxation. Here the principle of
neutrality not only has no legitimate role to play but would, if implemented,
be counterproductive to the very interests that it purportedly promotes.
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